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Abstract  
 
Tracking multiple objects as they move around the environment is a crucial everyday skill. 
This thesis investigated whether attention can be split unequally between moving objects to 
determine the nature of the attentional resource that underlies tracking. Fixed architectural 
models argue that a limited number of slots support tracking whereas flexible models 
propose a continuous pool of resources. A modified MOT task was developed which 
required participants to split their attention unequally between moving objects. Under both 
theories, unequal attention splitting is theoretically possible. However, each theory predicts 
a different pattern of results in an unequal attention splitting paradigm. Under a fixed 
account, a stepped increase in performance as target importance increases is predicted 
whereas, under a flexible account, a graded increase in performance is predicted. Chapters 
2 and 3 showed that participants could split attention unequally in response to target 
priority and reward. Across four experiments, there were mixed results regarding the nature 
(i.e. stepped or graded) of the increase in performance as target importance increases. 
Therefore, hybrid models of MOT need to be developed which combine components of 
both fixed and flexible theories. Chapter 4 found no evidence for attentional narrowing 
under conditions of anxiety but further demonstrated unequal attention splitting. The 
overarching conclusion of this thesis is that unequal attention splitting is possible, indicating 
some flexibility to the attentional resource. Further research using the unequal attention 
splitting paradigm has the potential to distinguish theories of multiple object tracking. 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
 
1.1 Thesis Overview 
 
This thesis aims to distinguish between fixed and flexible theories of multiple object 
tracking (MOT). Fixed theories argue that a limited number of slots underlie tracking 
whereas flexible theories propose a continuous resource. An unequal attention-splitting 
MOT task was developed to investigate whether participants can prioritise one target 
relative to another and, therefore, split attention unequally. As target importance increases, 
fixed and flexible theories predict a stepped and graded increase in performance, 
respectively. Eight experiments manipulated target priority and reward to investigate their 
effect of tracking performance. The pattern of results from these experiments provides 
insight into the debate regarding the structure of the attentional resource that underlies 
tracking.   
 
1.2 Overview of Multiple Object Tracking 
 
Many everyday tasks require us to track multiple spatially distinct objects as they 
move around the environment. For example, drivers track the surrounding vehicles, cyclists 
and pedestrians to avoid any collisions and athletes might track the ball, their team mates 
and their opposition to successfully execute an interception. Occupations such as CCTV 
monitoring and air traffic control also utilise this skill. It is unsurprising, therefore, that there 
is a large amount of research aimed at understanding our ability to track multiple moving 
objects.  
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The multiple object tracking (MOT) paradigm, first developed by Pylyshyn and Storm 
(1988), has been used extensively to investigate MOT in a laboratory setting. In a typical 
MOT task, several objects are presented on screen, a subset of which are identified as 
targets by either a colour change or temporary flashing. The targets then return to being 
visually identical to distractors and participants are instructed to track the targets as they 
move around the screen for several seconds (or minutes, see Wolfe, Place, & Horowitz, 
2007). At the end of a trial, all objects stop moving and one of four response procedures 
have typically been used to index tracking performance (see Hulleman, 2005, for a review). 
Mark-all (i.e. “select all the targets”) and Probe-one (i.e. “was this object a target?”) query 
participants about the status of an object (i.e. target or distractor). Trajectory- and position-
tracking tasks require participants to report on the final trajectory and position of a queried 
target, respectively.  
 
1.3 Factors Affecting MOT  
 
It is well documented that manipulating task parameters affects tracking 
performance. Franconeri, Jonathan, and Scimeca (2010) suggest that the three primary 
factors influencing tracking are target speed, target number and inter-object spacing. 
Research has shown a decrease in tracking accuracy when participants must track more 
targets (Pylyshyn & Storm, 1988; Yantis, 1992), with early research leading to the proposal 
of a four-item limit for tracking (e.g. Intriligator & Cavanagh, 2001; Pylyshyn & Storm, 1988; 
Scholl, Pylyshyn, & Feldman, 2001).  Poorer tracking performance is also revealed when the 
speed of the targets increases (e.g. Alvarez & Franconeri, 2007; Tombu & Seiffert, 2008) and 
when inter-object spacing decreases (e.g. Alvarez & Franconeri, 2007; Franconeri, Lin, 
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Pylyshyn, Fisher, & Enns, 2008; Tombu & Seiffert, 2008). Franconeri and colleagues (2007; 
2008; 2010) argued that the primary constraint on performance is inter-object spacing 
because the speed limit for tracking an unlimited number of objects is the same as the 
speed limit for tracking one object when spacing is held constant. This argument was further 
supported by research showing that overlapping objects, through them expanding and 
contracting, increases crowding which leads to a decrease in tracking performance (Howe, 
Holcombe, Lapierre, & Cropper, 2013; Van Marle & Scholl, 2003).  
 
Other variables have also been identified as affecting tracking accuracy. Tracking 
performance is better when there are fewer distractors (Bettencourt & Somers, 2009; Sears 
& Pylyshyn, 2000) and when there is greater distinctiveness (i.e. fewer shared features) 
between targets and distractors and, therefore, less interference (e.g. Feria, 2012; Makovski 
& Jiang, 2009). Alvarez and Cavanagh (2005) showed that tracking capacity is independently 
constrained to the left and right hemifields because twice as many targets could be 
successfully tracked when they were divided between the left and right hemifields 
compared to when they were all presented in the same hemifields, a result supported by 
Hudson, Howe, and Little (2012) in a multiple identity tracking (MIT) paradigm, in which 
information about both spatial location of an object is required (although it was not as 
strong). Meyerhoff, Papenmeier, Jahn, and Huff (2013) showed that changes in the direction 
of targets impair tracking performance, with Howe and Holcombe (2012) revealing evidence 
that tracking performance was better when objects moved in predictable, compared with 
random motion paths. Luu and Howe (2015) also showed that when objects moved along 
linear paths, performance was better than when objects randomly changed direction every 
300-600ms.  
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1.4 Cognitive Processes in MOT 
 
Multiple Object Tracking is an attentionally demanding task. Pylyshyn (2006) used a 
dual-task set up in which participants performed a MOT and probe detection task 
simultaneously. In the probe detection task, participants had to respond as quickly as 
possible when they detected a probe on the computer screen. A larger percentage of 
probes were detected when they were presented on a target, indicating that attention was 
allocated towards these locations (Pylyshyn, 2006). The same pattern of results has been 
found in subsequent research (Huff, Papenmeier, & Zacks, 2012; Pylyshyn, 2006; Pylyshyn, 
Haladjian, King, & Reilly, 2008; Sears & Pylyshyn, 2000). Pylyshyn (2006) also found evidence 
that distractors were inhibited during tracking because detection rates were higher when 
the probe appeared in an empty background compared with on a distractor (Pylyshyn, 
2006). This further implicates an attentional component to tracking, with attention-related 
inhibition proposed to be a top-down, goal-directed process (Watson & Humphreys, 1997; 
Braithwaite, Humphreys, & Hodsoll, 2003). Using a dual task set up, Tombu and Seiffert 
(2008) showed that MOT performance interfered with a tone discrimination task and Kunar, 
Carter, Cohen, and Horowitz (2008) showed that MOT performance was disrupted when 
performed concurrently with a telephone conversation. These dual-task studies clearly 
highlight the attentional demands of MOT. In addition, Huang, Mo and Li (2012) explored 
the interrelations between multiple visual attention paradigms to assess whether they were 
measuring the same underlying construct. Although MOT did not correlate with all other 
paradigms, it was correlated with a general factor of visual attention. Since the main 
features of the MOT task closely match attentional demands of real-world tracking, this task 
can be used to better understand the basic principles of visual attention.  
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 Tracking also requires a visual selection component in which participants must 
correctly mentally tag targets at the start of a trial. Ma and Flombaum (2013) showed that 
errors in MOT arise due to uncertainty about the number of targets at the start of a trial 
which implicates visual selection as being a crucial part of tracking. Wolfe, Place, and 
Horowitz (2007) introduced the notion of multiple object juggling because it is rare that 
target objects are identified simultaneously and remain constant over time. Participants 
were able to juggle multiple objects, namely they could select and then drop targets within 
a trial demonstrating a role of selection within a trial, as well as at the start of a trial. 
Neurophysiological evidence from research using event-related potentials (ERPs) also 
supports a distinction between selection and tracking (Drew & Vogel, 2008).  The N2pc 
component reflects the selection of targets amongst distractors and the CDA component 
reflects sustained attention during tracking (Drew & Vogel, 2008). 
 
In MOT tasks, participants must both continuously monitor the changing spatial 
locations of targets (i.e. tracking) and actively maintain target representations over time 
which requires visual working memory (VWM), another process involved in MOT. Drew, 
Horowitz, Wolfe, and Vogel (2011) revealed neural activity that indicates two separate 
mechanisms are involved in tracking: an indexing mechanism that is closely tied to VWM 
and a mechanism that tracks target locations. Oksama and Hyönä (2004) explored individual 
differences in MOT performance and revealed that visuospatial short-term memory capacity 
was a significant predictor of MOT, highlighting a role for memory within tracking. The well-
documented finding that participants can track objects through occlusion (e.g. Flombaum, 
Scholl & Pylyshyn, 2008; Horowitz, Birnkrant, Fencsik, Tran, & Wolfe, 2006; Scholl & Pylyshn, 
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1999) also implicates memory within a MOT framework. More specifically, Horowitz et al. 
(2006) suggest that participants can tolerate such gaps in tracking by using memory to store 
the object’s characteristic when it disappears and retrieve such memories when the object 
reappears. Fougnie and Marois (2009) showed that a tracking task disrupted feature binding 
in VWM which suggests a dual-task cost and role of VWM in tracking (although see Fougnie 
& Marois, 2006, for earlier conflicting evidence). Meanwhile, Green and Bavelier (2006) 
reported that video-game players were able to track more objects which they proposed was 
due to changes in VWM capacity. This finding fits with training studies that have shown that 
an increase in VWM capacity is associated with improved MOT performance (Vartanian, 
Coady, & Blackler, 2016). Together, such research suggests a role of VWM in MOT.   
 
1.5 Theories of MOT 
 
The well-documented limits on performance (e.g. speed, spacing, target number) 
indicate that there is a finite attentional resource available to support tracking. Specifically, 
by increasing the difficulty of a MOT task, the attentional resource can be exhausted to the 
extent that a second object cannot be tracked (Holcombe & Chen, 2012). The structure of 
this resource is debated, with two competing theoretical frameworks. Fixed theorists 
propose a fixed architectural system consisting of a limited number of discrete pointers or 
slots (e.g. Pylyshyn, 1989), whereas flexible theorists argue for a continuous pool of 
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resources (e.g. Alvarez & Franconeri, 2007). Figure 1.1 shows a schematic diagram for the 
main theories of MOT, which are outlined below. 
 
Figure 1.1. Schematic diagram of the main theories of MOT. Panels A, B and C represent 
fixed theories and Panels D and E represent flexible theories. Reprinted from “Studying 
visual attention using the multiple object tracking paradigm: a tutorial review”, by H. S. 
Meyerhoff, F. Papenmeier, and M. Huff, 2017. Attention, Perception, and Psychophysics, 79, 
1255. Copyright 2017 by Springer.   
 
1.5.1 Fixed Theories of MOT 
 
Fixed theories emerged following the consistent finding that approximately four 
targets could be accurately tracked in MOT tasks (e.g. Intriligator & Cavanagh, 2001; 
Pylyshyn & Storm, 1988; Scholl, Pylyshyn & Feldman, 2001). Pylyshyn’s (1989) Fingers of 
Instantiation (FINST) model consists of a fixed set (i.e. three, four, or five) of visual indexes 
or slots, called ‘FINSTs’, that can be assigned to objects to provide a connection between the 
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outside world and visual representations in cognition (note Pylyshyn, 2001, added additional 
assumptions and modified some terminology but the basic claims remain) (see Figure 1.1, 
panel A). FINSTs are characterised as preconceptual1 because they do not encode 
information about object identities; rather they stick to the object during motion supporting 
automatic tracking. There is evidence in support of this model from other visual paradigms 
(note this is a theory of vision, rather than a specific theory of MOT) including visual search 
and subitizing (e.g. Pylyshyn, 1994; Pylyshyn, Burkell, Fisher, Sears, Schmidt, & Trick, 1994), 
which also show a capacity limit of four or five objects, supporting the notion of a fixed 
architectural system.  
 
Yantis (1992) proposed a perceptual grouping model which argues that, during 
tracking, targets are grouped into a higher order visual representation (i.e. three targets into 
a triangle, four targets into a quadrant) (see Figure 1.1., Panel B). Yantis (1992) showed that 
tracking was better when the higher order object remained intact during tracking compared 
with when it collapsed indicating that participants’ ability to maintain perceptual grouping 
affects tracking performance. Both Yantis’ (1992) grouping formation and Pylyshyn’s (1989) 
indexing are proposed to be pre-attentive indicating some similarity between these two 
models. However, the maintenance of grouping during tracking is effortful and attentionally 
demanding whereas Pylyshn’s FINSTs are automatically attached to targets during the 
tracking phases. Fehd and Seiffert (2008) monitored eye-movements and revealed that 
observers tend to fixate the (invisible) centroid rather than the individual objects during 
tracking, furthersupporting a centroid-tracking mechanism. They then showed that 
                                                                
1 This was called ‘preattentive’ in earlier work but was changed to make it clear that focussed attention can 
play a role in tracking  
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centroid-looking behaviour is predictive of successful tracking (Fehd & Seiffert, 2010). 
Lukavsky and Děchtěrenko (2013; 2016) showed that there is stability in eye-movements 
across repetitions of trials which further suggests that a standard grouping mechanism 
might be used on every trial, regardless of the object movements. Nevertheless, properties 
of moving objects including object speed (Huff, Papenmeier, Jahn, & Hesse, 2010), tracking 
load (Zelinsky & Neider, 2008) and inter-object spacing (Zelinsky & Todor, 2010) have been 
shown to alter fixation behaviour. Specifically, an increase in speed, tracking load and 
reduced inter-object spacing leads to an increase in centroid looking. Overall, the pattern of 
results supports the idea of an automatic grouping during tracking.  
 
Cavanagh and Alvarez’s (2005) multifocal theory posits that multiple foci of attention 
track each object by supporting continuous attentional access to the objects being tracked 
(see Figure 1.1, Panel C). Evidence in support of multiple foci of attention comes from 
Alvarez and Cavanagh’s (2005) research showing that participants were able to track twice 
as many objects when they were equally distributed across hemifields, demonstrating 
independence in the capacity to attentively track targets in the left and right visual 
hemifields. This rules out the possibility of a single focus of attention that cycles through 
each target to support tracking. Howe, Cohen, Pinto and Horowitz (2010) adapted the 
simultaneous-sequential paradigm (Eriksen & Spencer, 1969) within MOT. In the 
simultaneous condition all objects moved and paused simultaneously whereas in the 
sequential condition the objects were randomly divided into two groups that moved 
alternatively.  There was no difference in tracking accuracy between objects in the 
simultaneous and sequential conditions. This shows that attention is spread in parallel, 
supporting the notion of multiple foci of attention. Importantly, however, there is evidence 
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suggesting serial components to tracking (e.g. Howard, Masom, & Holcombe, 2011; 
d’Avossa, Shulman, Snyder, & Corbetta, 2006; Holcombe & Chen, 2013). In line with 
Pylyshyn (1989) and Yantis (1992), this model suggests that the limitation on tracking are 
due to architectural constraints such as the number of attentional foci.  
 
1.5.2 Flexible Theories of MOT 
 
Flexible resource theories suggest that there is a continuous pool of the attentional 
resource that can be drawn upon for tracking multiple objects. These theories emerged 
following findings that participants could track up to eight targets simultaneously (e.g. 
Alvarez & Franconeri, 2007), although capacity limits were below four or five when the 
objects moved at fast speeds (Alvarez & Franconeri, 2007; Holcombe & Chen, 2012). 
Research showing expertise effects, with certain populations (e.g. video gamers) being able 
to track more than four objects (Green & Bavelier, 2006) and individual differences in 
tracking ability (e.g. Oksama & Hyönä, 2004), also challenge fixed architectural accounts of 
tracking.  
 
Alvarez and Franconeri (2007) proposed the FLEX model (FLEXibly allocated indexes) 
which suggests that objects are tracked by flexible indexes (FLEXes), with the total number 
of indexes limited by the finite resource (see Figure 1.1, Panel D). The limit on tracking is set 
by this shared resource that determines the resolution of each FLEX such that when fewer 
items are tracked, the tracking resolution is higher, consistent with findings relating to 
spatial precision of target representations (Howard & Holcombe, 2008; Howard, Masom, & 
Holcombe, 2011). Tracking errors arise when the attentional resource is insufficient to cover 
the demands (e.g. speed, proximity) of all targets, which is supported by Horotwiz and 
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Cohen (2010) who showed that the precision of trajectory tracking decreased with an 
increase in tracking load (i.e. more demands). It also explains well-documented phenomena 
across the MOT literature including flexible switching between tasks (Alvarez, Horowitz, 
Arsenio, DiMase, & Wolfe, 2005), or flexible switching between location and identity 
tracking (Cohen, Pinto, Howe, & Horowitz, 2011). Nevertheless, it has been criticised for not 
fulfilling the criteria of a good scientific theory (Meyerhoff, Papenmeier, & Huff, 2017) 
because it is under specified.    
 
Franconeri, Jonathan, and Scimeca (2010) proposed the spatial interference theory 
of MOT which suggests that the constraints on tracking are determined by the spatial 
relationship between targets and distractors (i.e. objects that participants do not have to 
keep track of) (see Figure 1.1, Panel E). This alternative to the FLEX model suggests tracking 
errors are the result of distractors or other targets entering the inhibitory surround (i.e. a 
spatial region) of targets (Meyerhoff, Papenmeier & Huff, 2017). This is supported by 
Holcombe, Chen, and Howe (2014) who showed that attentional tracking can be impaired 
by the presence of a second object, particularly when that second object is another target, 
thus highlighting the role of spatial interference.  
 
1.5.3 Hybrid models of Visual Working Memory  
 
A parallel debate persists in the visual working memory (VWM)2 literature in which a 
capacity limit of 3-5 items has often been reported (Cowan, 2001). Such findings have led to 
the proposal of fixed, slot-based theories of VWM which suggest that, irrespective of the 
                                                                
2 Visual working memory and visual short-term memory are used interchangeably in the literature. Visual 
working memory is used throughout this manuscript for consistency and clarity.   
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complexity of objects, only a limited, fixed number of items can be stored (e.g. Awh, Barton, 
& Vogel, 2007; Luck & Vogel, 1997). Other authors (e.g. Alvarez & Cavanagh, 2004; Eng, 
Chen, & Jiang, 2005) propose that the number of objects that can be stored is more flexible 
and determined by the complexity of objects.  
 
Utilising mixture models, Zhang and Luck (2008) obtained independent indexes of 
the capacity and resolution of VWM which contributed to the proposal of two hybrid 
models to explain the capacity limits of VWM. These models acknowledge that capacity 
limits could be the result of both a limited number of slots and a limited number of 
resources. The slots + resources model postulates that there are a fixed number of slots in 
memory but a variable resource exists that can be distributed unequally between these slots 
(Zhang & Luck, 2008). A slots + averaging model suggests that, when the number of items to 
be remembered is at or above capacity, each item has a single slot assigned to it. When 
fewer items are to be remembered, each item can be assigned more than one slot.   
 
The ability to distinguish between fixed and flexible mechanisms underlies a variety 
of questions within cognitive psychology which are inherently related. Characterising the 
mechanisms that underlie tracking is therefore important to provide a greater 
understanding of other, related cognitive processes.  
 
1.6 Adaptions of the MOT Paradigm 
 
MOT research is commonly motivated by using real-world examples such as tracking 
cars, aircrafts or teammates. Therefore, developing the MOT task to more closely reflect 
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these real-life situations can provide more naturalistic tasks that may facilitate investigation 
into the mechanisms that support tracking in everyday situations. To date, there have been 
several adaptions of the MOT paradigm to try to better capture real-world tracking.  
 
Multiple Identity Tracking (MIT) requires participants to maintain information about 
both the spatial location and identity of an object because, in everyday life, objects typically 
have distinct identities that are relevant to the current task (e.g. Oksama & Hyönä, 2004). 
Horowitz, Klieger, Fencsik, Yang, Alvarez, and Wolfe (2007) used an MIT task using cartoon 
animals. There were two response modes. Participants either reported the locations of all 
target items or the identity of a particular object. The capacity for tracking multiple 
identities was lower than tracking multiple positions suggesting that there may be two 
separate systems: one carrying positional information and the other carrying identity 
information. Oksama and Hyönä (2016) compared tracking performance for identical 
objects and distinct objects with identities and also found the same pattern of results, 
further suggesting two separate and independent systems. Oksama and Hyönä (2008) 
present a serial model of multiple identity tracking (MOMIT). Identity-location bindings are 
refreshed serially and supported by a capacity-limited episodic buffer whilst a position 
tracking system monitors the positions of targets in parallel.   
 
Wolfe and colleagues (2007; 2018) modified the MOT task to more closely capture 
components of real-world tracking. Wolfe, Place, and Horowitz (2007) explored the extent 
to which participants can juggle targets because, in the real-world, target items will change 
over time and it is rare that all target items are identified at one time point (i.e. the starting 
phase of a typical MOT task). Moreover, tracking in the real-world must often be maintained 
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over minutes rather than seconds. Participants were able to juggle objects by selecting and 
deselecting the target at given time points with little cost to performance. Moreover, this 
ability could be maintained for up to 10 minutes at a time. Wu and Wolfe (2018) introduced 
a Multiple Object Awareness (MOA) measure within an MIT framework because they argued 
that approximate knowledge of an object’s location is still knowledge that should be 
recognised. They reported that MOA capacity is at least double the capacity typically 
observed for identity tracking and highlighted the importance of utilising measures such as 
this within MOT research.  
 
Thornton and colleagues (2014; 2015) introduced the interactive Multiple Object 
Tracking (iMOT) task to more closely capture tracking in the real-world whereby an 
individual must interact with their environment. For example, a driver must brake their car if 
one of the other cars they are tracking swerves in front of them. The iMOT task required 
participants to track multiple moving objects and prevent any collisions, by touching the 
screen, to gain an index of how many items an individual could control without collision. 
Participants could control (i.e. iMOT performance) more objects than they could track (i.e. 
standard MOT performance), but performance was positively correlated (Thornton, 
Bülthoff, Horowitz, Rynning, & Lee, 2014). Thornton and Horowitz (2015) then showed that 
planning and executing a display-relevant motor action did not impair on tracking 
performance.  
 
Scott-Samuel, Holmes, Baddeley, & Cuthill (2015) used a single-object tracking task, 
inspired by the MOT task, within camouflage research to better understand how various 
parameters affect the confusion effect, whereby predators’ success is reduced when prey 
 
15 
 
group size or density increases due to a sensory bottleneck in which it is difficult to track 
one object among many. Tracking accuracy for a single object decreased as density and 
unpredictability of motion paths increased. In an adaption of this single object tracking task, 
Hogan and colleagues (2016, 2017) developed a task in which participants had to track the 
movement of a single target amongst other visually identical objects using a mouse. Average 
distance between the cursor and the target during the tracking period was taken as an index 
of tracking accuracy. Tracking accuracy increased when there was variation in the speed of 
the objects which was proposed to undermine the confusion effect (Hogan, Cuthill, & Scott-
Samuel, 2017). Targets with stripes parallel to the direction of motion were harder to track 
than those with more conventional background matching patterns (Hogan, Scott-Samuel, & 
Cuthill, 2016; Hogan, Cuthill, & Scott-Samuel, 2016) demonstrating that dazzle camouflage, 
in which complex patterns effect the perception of an objects speed, direction and identity, 
enhances the confusion effect. Similar findings were shown in three dimensions, with the 
confusion effect revealed in a task where participants used a joystick to approach and 
‘catch’ the target (Hogan, Hildenbrandt, Scott-Samuel, Cuthill, & Hemelrijk). Although such 
tasks do not require participants to perform MOT, many of the same cognitive processes are 
required.  
1.7 New Adaptions to the MOT Task 
 
The aim of this thesis was to modify the MOT task and response procedures to more 
closely reflect real world tracking and, therefore, gain insight into the underlying attentional 
resource.   
 
1.7.1 Unequal Attention Splitting 
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In standard MOT tasks, the relative importance of the targets being tracked is equal. 
This is atypical of everyday situations in which an individual may need to prioritise one 
target relative to another and so allocate attention unequally. For example, a driver would 
likely allocate more attention to the cyclist swerving in front of them than the pedestrian 
walking on the pavement, and a carer would likely prioritise monitoring a toddler over a 
teenager in a playground. Investigating participants ability to split attention unequally can 
provide insight into the nature of the resource underlying tracking. Both fixed and flexible 
theories are currently based on results from experiments using assumed equal attention 
splitting. Under either the fixed or flexible theories, unequal attention splitting, in which 
objects for tracking are allocated different amounts of the attentional resource, is 
theoretically possible. As an analogy to help distinguish the two accounts, water can be used 
to represent the attentional resource underlying tracking (see Figure 1.2). Under a fixed 
account, water takes the solid form of ice cubes and so the fixed number of ice cubes or 
slots can be unequally distributed across objects in only a limited number of ways (i.e. 
attention slots could be split between two targets according to a limited number of ratios: 
4:0; 3:1; 2:2 or 5:0; 4:1; 3:2). In contrast, under a flexible account water takes the liquid 
form and so can be flexibly allocated unequally in any way (e.g. 37%:63%). Exploring if and 
how attention can be split unequally can distinguish these accounts. Under a fixed account, 
a stepped increase in performance as target priority increases is predicted whereas (Figure 
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1.2, Row A), under a flexible account, a graded increase in performance would be predicted 
(Figure 1.2, Row B).  
Figure 1.2. Schematic diagram to demonstrate the analogy of water as the attentional 
resource taking either a A) Fixed or B) Flexible form.  
 
It is important to recognise that the structure of the attentional resource could fall 
anywhere between these fixed and flexible accounts and so a key question to address is 
how flexible the resource is. Although currently not specifically developed within a MOT 
framework, hybrid models of attention have been proposed in the VWM literature (Zhang & 
Luck, 2008). A slots + resources model suggests that there are a fixed number of slots but 
the resource can be unequally allocated between these slots. As an analogy, Zhang and Luck 
(2008) explain that there could be two cups (the slots) and one bottle of juice (the 
resource). One cup could receive most of the juice and another cup could receive only a few 
drops demonstrating an unequal allocation of the resource between two fixed slots. A slots 
+ averaging model postulates a fixed number of slots, but more than one slot can be applied 
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to a given target if below capacity. As an analogy, Zhang and Luck (2008) suggest that there 
might be four juice boxes available and these could be differentially allocated between two 
targets (i.e. 1 and 3 boxes to Target 1 and 2, respectively).  
 
1.7.2 Manipulating Situational Factors 
 
MOT is commonly undertaken in pressurised, anxiety-provoking environments such 
as the military, air traffic control and sport. Research is therefore warranted to understand 
the effect of state anxiety on performance within a MOT framework. Moreover, 
understanding the interplay between attention and anxiety provides insight into how the 
attentional resource operates in different conditions. There are many theories that explain 
the relationship between anxiety and performance (e.g. Beilock & Carr, 2001; Eysenck & 
Calvo, 1992) and, more recently, those that explain the effect of anxiety on attention, 
specifically (e.g. Eysenck, Derakshan, Santos, & Calvo, 2007; Easterbrook, 1959). The theory 
of attentional narrowing suggests that, in response to anxiety, the attentional window 
narrows (Easterbrook, 1959), with research showing that performance on a central task 
increases whilst performance on a peripheral task decreases. An unequal splitting MOT 
framework facilitates a direct test of this theory by exploring if state anxiety leads to a 
different distribution of the attentional resource under anxious compared with control 
conditions. Such investigation can also provide insight into the wider debate regarding the 
flexibility of the resource that underlies tracking performance.  
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1.8 Summary of Empirical Chapters 
 
1.8.1 Chapter 2. Goal-directed unequal attention allocation during multiple object 
tracking 
 
 
Adapted from: Crowe, E. M., Howard, C. J., Attwood, A. S., Kent, C. (2019). Goal-directed 
unequal attention allocation during multiple object tracking. Attention, Perception and 
Psychophysics. doi:10.3758/s13414-019-01674-y. 
 
When tracking multiple objects in a dynamic environment one may need to prioritise one 
object over another and so allocate attention unequally. Chapter 2 introduces a novel MOT 
task that was developed to capture this element of real-world tracking and gain insight into 
the structure of the attentional resource. Target priority was manipulated to explore its 
effect on tracking performance in trajectory- and position-tracking tasks. Four studies 
showed that attention can be divided unequally between multiple moving targets. 
Specifically, more and less attention can be allocated to higher and lower priority targets, 
respectively, as indexed by the magnitude of error (Experiments 1 – 3). Modelled 
proportions of guessing responses and spread of errors were also affected by target priority, 
with a lower proportion of guessing and higher precision for high priority targets 
(Experiments 1 – 3). These results indicate some flexibility to the attentional resource which 
must be incorporated into models of MOT.  
 
 
1.8.2 Chapter 3. Reward-based unequal attention allocation in position tracking 
 
 
Adapted from a paper submitted to Attention, Perception and Psychophysics.  
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In Chapter 3, the unequal attention splitting MOT task was utilised to examine reward-
based unequal attention allocation. Experiment 4 showed that participants could split 
attention unequally in a reward-based manner, supporting the results of Chapter 2. 
Experiments 5 and 6 introduce a double-probe procedure in which participants were 
required to report on the final locations of two targets presented simultaneously. A Tracking 
Accuracy Comparison (TAC) score was then obtained by calculating the difference in 
tracking accuracy between the two targets. This provided insight into the relationship 
between tracking accuracy for two targets. Both experiments revealed a main effect of 
reward, further indicating flexibility to the attentional resource, but there was no effect of 
splitting condition (i.e. unequal versus equal splitting) on TAC scores and no correlation in 
tracking accuracy for the two targets. There was, however, evidence for memory decay and 
interference in the dual-report tracking task, with poorer accuracy for the second target, 
highlighting the role of memory in a MOT paradigm.  
 
1.8.3 Chapter 4. No evidence for attentional narrowing within a MOT framework 
 
MOT is commonly undertaken in anxiety-provoking environments and, therefore, research 
exploring the effect of anxiety on MOT performance is warranted.  In Chapter 4, the effect 
of state anxiety on MOT performance was investigated. More specifically, the unequal 
attention-splitting MOT task was used to test the theory of attentional narrowing. 
Attentional narrowing theories predict that, under anxiety, performance on a central task is 
better at the cost of performance on a peripheral task (Easterbrook, 1959). In line with this, 
we predicted that participants would direct more attention to the high priority target in the 
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anxious compared with non-anxious condition. Experiment 7 manipulated anxiety using a 
cognitive anxiety induction technique, but the manipulation check showed that it was not 
successful at inducing anxiety. Therefore, Experiment 8 used a physiological anxiety 
induction technique, the 7.5% CO2 challenge model of anxiety induction, which was 
successful at inducing anxiety. There was, however, no evidence for attentional narrowing. 
There was also no evidence for main effect of anxiety on performance when all participants 
were grouped together. Exploratory analysis showed that some participants demonstrated 
an increase in performance during the inhalation of CO2 whereas others performance 
decreased, which resulted in there being no overall main effect. The implications of this 
finding for anxiety research is discussed.  
 
 
1.9 Apparatus and Task 
 
Unless stated otherwise, the following apparatus was used. Experiments were 
programmed in MATLAB (The MathWorks Inc, 2014) and the Psychophysics Toolbox 
(Brainard, 1997; Kleiner, Brainard, & Pelli, 2007; Pelli, 1997). Participants’ responses were 
recorded using a standard mouse and USB keyboard. All tasks were completed in a dimly lit 
room and viewing distance was approximately 40 cm. Stimulus displays were presented on a 
17-inch CRT monitor with a resolution of 1,024 x 768 pixels and a refresh rate of 85Hz.  
 
On each trial, participants fixated a central black fixation cross with eight black discs 
with a radius of 1.14° of visual angle. The two targets and six distractors were presented 
simultaneously on a mid-grey screen at the start of each trial for 2,000 ms. At the start of 
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each trial, each target had a number presented on it denoting either the likelihood of that 
target being queried at the end of a trial or the number of points that a participant would be 
rewarded for correctly tracking that target. The discs then moved randomly around the 
screen at an average speed of 15.8° (range 12.75° – 21.95°) per second for between 5,000 - 
8,000 ms (randomised for each trial) and underwent perfectly elastic collisions whenever 
they collided with the edge of the display or another disc. At the end of a trial, participants 
performed either a trajectory- or position-tracking response.  
 
Trajectory Tracking. At the end of the trial, all discs disappeared except one of the 
targets, which remained on the screen. Participants clicked inside the target to activate it 
which caused a Iine, 1.14° long, to extend from the targets’ centre. The direction of the line 
was determined by the position of the participants mouse click. Participants then moved the 
line (using the mouse) to report the target’s trajectory and clicked to confirm their answer. 
Feedback, consisting of a arrow indicating the correct direction of heading, was given on 
each trial for 2,000 ms, after which the next trial was presented (see Figure 1.3). 
 
Figure 1.3. Trajectory-tracking task trial timeline. 1) Eight discs are presented on screen; 2) 
All discs moved around the screen (note the arrows were not presented on screen); 3) All 
discs except one disappeared. Participants estimated what direction the disc was heading in 
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at the end of the trial using a rotatable pointer; 4) Participants were given feedback. A 
second arrow was presented which indicates the correct target trajectory. If a participant’s 
trajectory estimate was within 15 degrees of the correct trajectory, the arrow turned green. 
Otherwise, it turned red.   
 
Position Tracking. At the end of a trial, all discs disappeared. Participants were 
verbally instructed, via headphones, to localise one of the targets. Localisation required 
participants to move the mouse cursor and left-click the position that they thought the cued 
target occupied at offset. After a response had been made, the correct position was 
indicated by redisplaying the target item in its correct final position. The disc representing 
the participant’s estimated final position of the target was also shown coloured green 
(correct) or red (incorrect), depending on whether selected coordinates fell within the 
circumference of the target or not. Feedback was given for 2,000 ms, after which the next 
trial started (see Figure 1.4).  
Figure 1.4. Position-tracking task trial timeline. 1) Participants are presented with a starting 
screen consisting of a central fixation cross and eight black discs; 2) The discs then move 
around the screen (note the arrows were not presented on screen); 3) All of the discs then 
disappear, and participants are cued, through headphones, which target to localise; 4) 
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Participants are given feedback on their response. Their guess turned green if they were 
correct or red if they were not.  
 
1.10  Ethics and Pre-registration 
 
Ethical approval was granted by the University of Bristol, Faculty of Life Sciences 
Research Ethics Committee for all studies. All participants reported normal or corrected-to-
normal vision and hearing. Written informed consent was obtained from all participants. 
The study aims, hypothesis and design for all studies (excluding Chapter 2, Experiment 1) 
were pre-registered prior to data collection on the Open Science Framework 
(https://osf.io/myprojects/)3.  
 
1.11 Pre-registration  
 
Following the reproducibility crisis (e.g. Aarts et al., 2015; Munafò et al., 2017; 
Nosek, Ebersole, DeHaven, & Mellor, 2018), there has been an increasing focus on pre-
registration to help improve the reliability and credibility of research (Munafo et al., 2017). 
Therefore, most experiments in this thesis were pre-registered on the OSF. Specifically, the 
study background, aims, hypothesis, design, sample size calculation and statistical analysis 
were all planned prior to data collection (i.e. the strongest form of pre-registration). Pre-
registration clearly distinguishes between the two stages of science: 1) Exploratory (i.e. 
hypothesis generation); 2) Confirmation (i.e. hypothesis testing). One aim of pre-registration 
is to overcome publication bias and analytical flexibility (Munafo et al., 2017). Studies that 
reveal positive results are more likely to be published (Franco, Malhotra, & Simonovits, 
                                                                
3 All deviations from the initial pre-registration on the Open Science Framework are reported in Appendix 1.  
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2014), and researchers have been known to modify their statistical plan to report and 
highlight those that show statistical significance, thereby increasing the chances of 
publication. This ultimately leads to an increase in the chance that spurious results, 
contingent on potential p-hacking are published (Simmons, Nelson, & Simonsohn, 2011). 
Whilst pre-registration is beneficial in principle, in practice I have found it to be a difficult 
process during the course of my PhD. Whilst I advocate open science, I think that current 
pre-registration practices need refinement.  
 
During my PhD I have gained experience with the publication process and, 
ultimately, have edited my papers to favour the reviewer’s preferences. Such modifications 
include shortening the manuscript, modifying exclusion criteria and running different 
analysis which has led to several deviations from my initially pre-registered work. In one 
example, I edited the main analysis conducted to investigate the effects of interest which 
largely strengthened the paper. However, this resulted in extensive discussion regarding the 
extent to which I could claim pre-registration of my study because the primary statistical 
analysis was not what was initially stated. Whilst I understand concerns regarding phishing, I 
do not agree that this additional analysis constituted phishing. It was suggested externally 
by someone who had no access to the data, rather they had knowledge of an analysis that 
would fit the data we had collected. In other disciplines, such as epidemiology, large 
amounts of data are collected because they might be of interest. It is only later down the 
line that research questions are formulated, and hypothesis tested using a trial and error 
process of the most up-to-date method which results in re-analysis of the same data set 
numerous times. I therefore do not think it is fair to argue that all the research presented in 
this thesis is exploratory, rather than confirmatory.   
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My proposal to overcome such issues is to peer review pre-registrations. Developing 
research questions, hypothesis, study designs and statistical plans is difficult and would 
largely benefit from the input of numerous experts in one’s field of research whereas 
collecting data and then following a clear analysis plan is easier. I therefore think the 
recently emerging “registered -reports”, in which a preregistration proposal is approved and 
“in-principle acceptance” where final publication does not depend on the results in 
obtained, are a good idea. It also allows one to improve the preregistration proposal based 
on the reviewers’ comments, namely before data collection and before it is “too late”. 
Nevertheless, a large problem with this process is time and career pressures. Throughout 
my PhD there has been an ever-increasing requirement to publish but still an extremely long 
review process. Rather than running pilot studies, and developing ideas before pre-
registration, we delve straight into the answering of a specific research question because of 
an increased pressure to publish. Therefore, whilst one manuscript is peer-reviewed, the 
next series of experiments, which may have fundamental issues or could be drastically 
improved by reviewers’ comments, has already been pre-registered including all the 
limitations of the previous work. This is ultimately a vicious cycle that would require 
modification to current practices (i.e. requirement for registered reports) and a shift in focus 
for career development (i.e. high quality rather than high volume research articles). My 
overall impression is that collaboration and peer review are more effective and beneficial at 
the conception of a study, rather than much later in the publication process where it is 
arguably too late.  
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1.12 Data Analysis 
 
Unless stated otherwise, Linear Mixed Effects models (LMEs) (Baayen, Davidson, & 
Bates, 2008; Barr, Levy, Scheepers, & Tily, 2013) were used to analyse the data using the 
lme4 package (Bates, Mäechler, Bolker, & Walker 2014) for the R computing environment (R 
Development Core Team, 2014). All full models included a random effect of participants. 
Additional random effects and interactions were only added when the more complex mode 
fit the data significantly better according to a likelihood ratio test. For each experiment, the 
random and fixed effects included in each full model are reported. The t-statistics from the 
full model (even if the model contained non-significant main effects and interactions) 
alongside p-values from the model comparison procedure are reported. Post-hoc 
comparisons were conducted by comparing the slopes between two adjacent data points.  
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Chapter 2 Goal-directed unequal attention allocation during 
multiple object tracking 
 
2.1 Chapter Summary 
 
In standard multiple object tracking (MOT) tasks the relative importance of the targets being 
tracked is equal. This is atypical of everyday situations in which an individual may need to 
prioritise one target relative to another and so allocate attention unequally. Three 
experiments were designed to examine whether participants could unequally split attention 
using a modified MOT task in which target priority was manipulated. Specifically, the effect 
of priority on participants’ magnitude of error was examined using a distribution mixture 
analysis to investigate how priority affected both participants’ probability of losing an item 
and tracking precision. Experiment 1 (trajectory tracking) revealed a higher magnitude of 
error and higher proportion of guessing for the low compared with high priority targets. 
Experiments 2 (trajectory tracking) and 3 (position tracking) examined how fine-grained (i.e. 
the precision of splitting) unequal attention splitting is by manipulating target priority at 
finer increments. In line with Experiment 1, results from Experiments 2 and 3 indicated that 
participants could split attention unequally. There was some evidence that participants 
could allocate attention unequally at fine increments, but this was less conclusive. Taken 
together, these experiments demonstrate participants’ ability to distribute attention 
unequally across multiple moving objects, albeit with some limitation.  
 
2.2 Introduction 
 
Everyday activities require us to split our attention unequally between moving 
objects. However, current theories describing the attentional resource underlying tracking 
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are based on results from experiments using assumed equal attention splitting. Under both 
fixed and flexible theories, unequal attention splitting is theoretically possible, but these 
theories predict different patterns of results (see Figure 1.2). Therefore, researching 
investigating participants’ ability to split their attention unequally can help distinguish 
between fixed and flexible theories of tracking.  
 
Previous studies have demonstrated stimulus-driven unequal allocation. Liu et al., 
(2005) modified the typical MOT task so that half the objects moved at 1 degree/s and the 
other half at 6 degree/s. Since objects moving slower are typically tracked more accurately 
than those moving faster (Pylysyhn & Storm, 1988; Yantis, 1992), the authors expected 
poorer tracking accuracy for the faster moving targets. There was no difference in tracking 
performance between fast- and slow-moving targets, indicative of unequal attention 
allocation. More specifically, more of the resource could have been allocated to the faster 
(more demanding) target, which resulted in similar tracking accuracy across both speed 
conditions. Chen, Howe, and Holcombe (2013) compared the speed limits at which 
participants could track a critical target when the second target was moving at either the 
same or a slower speed. The speed limit for the critical target was higher if the second 
target was moving slowly rather than fast. This suggests that participants allocated attention 
unequally, with more attention available to allocate to the fast-moving target when the 
secondary target was moving slower. Together, these results provide evidence consistent 
with participants’ ability to unequally allocate attention in a stimulus-driven manner.  
 
Some authors have also examined participants’ ability to shift attention on-line (i.e. 
during a trial). Iordanescu, Grabowecky, and Suzuki (2009) argued that targets in crowded 
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situations (i.e. those in danger of being mistaken for distractors) were localized more 
precisely than uncrowded targets, suggesting that more attention was allocated to these 
‘high risk’ targets. This supports the notion of unequal attention allocation and, additionally, 
suggests that the attention allocated to a given target can be changed during tracking. 
Nevertheless, this result should be interpreted with some caution because proximity (to the 
nearest distracter) was not manipulated directly (i.e. object trajectories were randomly 
determined) and, therefore, other display characteristics could have been affected as well 
as proximity (Chen, Howe, & Holcombe, 2013; see also contradictory findings by Howard, 
Masom, & Holcombe, 2011). Howe et al. (2010) adapted the ‘simultaneous-sequential 
paradigm’ (Eriksen & Spencer, 1969) to examine whether attention could be reallocated 
between targets during tracking. In the simultaneous condition, all objects moved and 
paused simultaneously whereas in the sequential condition objects were divided into two 
groups and moved alternatively. There was no difference in tracking performance between 
objects in the simultaneous and sequential conditions which suggests that participants 
could not reallocate attention unequally between targets during tracking. Meyerhoff, 
Schwan, and Huff (2018) conducted a series of experiments to explore whether inter-object 
spacing guides visual attention. A bias towards temporarily close objects (both in term of 
spatial attention allocation and eye movements), which persisted even when the bias was 
harmful for the task, was observed indicating both unequal attention allocation and 
updating of attention allocation during a trial (see also, Zelinsky, & Todor, 2010). In other 
work Meyerhoff, Papenmeir, Jahn, and Huff (2016) revealed that such unequal allocation of 
the attentional resource in a stimulus-driven manner is advantageous to avoid confusion 
between targets and close distractors indicating that attention can be flexibly allocated 
during tracking.   
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Goal-directed unequal attention allocation in MOT has also been documented. 
Cohen, Pinto, Howe, and Horowitz (2011) modified the instructions given to participants in a 
MIT task. In one condition, participants were instructed to prioritise the locations over the 
identities of target and, in another, were instructed to place equal emphasis on both 
location and identity information. Position tracking performance was higher when 
prioritisation instructions were given demonstrating unequal attention allocation between 
the location and identity information associated with the same target. However, to our 
knowledge, no research has addressed whether participants can split attention unequally 
between distinct targets (i.e. not to different features of the same object but to different 
objects entirely) in a goal-directed manner. Examining the way in which participants can 
split attention unequally in a strategic manner has the potential to inform the debate 
regarding the structure of the attentional resource underlying tracking because the amount 
of attention allocated to a given object can be directly manipulated. This allows examination 
of the resource-versus-performance function, the shape of which would be different for 
fixed and flexible theories. As well as being theoretically important, unequal allocation of 
attention is highly relevant to the real-world in situations where one wishes to prioritise, 
and so allocate more attention to one target over another target, which nonetheless needs 
tracking.  
 
Yantis (1992) showed goal-directed attention allocation within a MOT framework. 
Participants who were instructed to group all targets together displayed higher tracking 
accuracy than those who were given neutral tracking instructions. This shows that 
participants modified their tracking strategy in a goal-directed manner. Brockhoff and Huff 
 
32 
 
(2016) combined a typical MOT task with a non-interfering top-down identification task. 
Participants were instructed to identify the behaviour of dynamic cartoon eyes. The cartoon 
eyes were the objects in the MOT task and the moving pupils cued either a single target or 
single distractor by all rotating to look towards that specific object. Participants could ignore 
or prioritise objects based on cueing, thus indicating goal-driven attention allocation during 
the MOT task. Taken together, these results demonstrate top-down mechanisms driving 
attentional allocation but do not provide any insight into the potential for top-down 
unequal attentional allocation between two simultaneously tracked objects within a trial.  
 
Goal-directed unequal attention allocation has been demonstrated in other 
attention-based tasks in which participants are instructed to allocate different proportions 
of their attention accordingly. Miller and Bonnell (1994) instructed participants to pay a 
certain amount of attention to a line-length discrimination task on the left side of the screen 
and the remaining attention to the right side and revealed that sensitivity increased with the 
proportion of attention devoted to that side. Fitousi (2016) instructed participants to 
allocate differential amounts of their attention to the top and bottom halves of a face. Such 
instructions were effective in modifying the amount of attention allocated to either half of 
the face, with participants’ performance improving as a function of attention allocation 
(Fitousi, 2016). Atkinson, Berry, Waterman, Baddeley, Hitch, and Allen (2018) used probe 
frequencies (i.e. how frequently a more valuable item was tested) to examine whether 
memory for an item was enhanced if participants were told it would be tested more 
frequently. Memory was enhanced for the relatively more valuable item indicating that 
attention can be directed according to probe frequencies. Using an effortful visual search 
task, Jiang, Sha, and Remington (2015) cued spatial attention to one visual quadrant using 
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either goal-driven instructions (i.e. instructing participants to prioritize it), location 
probability learning (i.e. placing the target there frequently) or reward (i.e. associating it 
with higher monetary gain). Results showed that successful goal-driven attention exerted 
the strongest influence on search response time which indicates that participants 
strategically allocated more attention, indexed by shorter reaction times, to the cued 
quadrant in a top-down manner. However, Chen, Howe, and Holcombe (2013) suggest that 
it would be difficult to induce participants to allocate a specific proportion of attention to 
two targets during a MOT task due to the extended duration of tracking across a MOT trial. 
We empirically test this claim here.  
 
A pilot experiment from our lab showed that participants could allocate more 
attention to an ‘über-target’ than to three standard targets using a two-alternative (i.e. 
target or distractor) forced choice task. The results showed that participants could allocate 
attention unequally dependent on top-down control, warranting further investigation into 
this ability. However, there were limitations with this experiment. The two-alternative 
forced choice response used to assess tracking performance yields only binary data (correct 
or incorrect). Although this is typical of many MOT studies, using a continuous measure of 
tracking accuracy, such as the magnitude of error for trajectory or position tracking, offers a 
more precise measure of attention allocation. In addition, it is possible to interpret the 
distribution of error magnitudes in order to test whether the difference in overall accuracy 
is due to increased guessing (as for example when participants lose track completely of an 
target), or a difference in the precision (due to the amount of allocated attention) of the 
tracked target. Another limitation was that participants were instructed to allocate ‘most’ of 
their attention to the über-target but no values detailing what ‘more’ constituted were 
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provided. It is possible, therefore, that one participant may interpret ‘more’ as 90% and 
another participant as 60% of their attentional resource so leading to variation in the 
prioritisation strategies adopted by participants. A more objective method for detailing the 
priority of targets might facilitate control of prioritisation strategies across participants. 
Subsequent research is required to overcome these limitations.  
  
Three experiments examined whether participants could split attention unequally to 
multiple moving objects in a goal-directed manner. An unequal attention splitting MOT task 
was developed in which the priority of targets was manipulated to examine the effect of 
target priority on tracking performance. Such modification resulted in the task 
encompassing components of both MOT and MIT. MIT requires participants to maintain 
location-identity bindings during tracking (Mayerhoff, Papenmeier, & Huff, 2017). This 
modified MOT task requires participants to assign a priority (i.e. an identity) to each target 
during a trial and therefore fits with an MIT task. However, the index of tracking 
performance fits more closely with the MOT literature because the targets’ position or 
trajectory is queried rather than an identity-related response.  
 
 
Experiment 1 examined whether participants could split attention unequally 
between high and low priority targets. Experiment 2 and 3 explored how fine-grained 
participants’ ability to allocate attention unequally was by manipulating the target priorities 
at finer increments. Tracking performance was measured as the absolute error between the 
actual and estimated trajectory (Experiments 1 and 2) or location (Experiment 3). In 
addition, a mixture distribution analysis (based on Zhang & Luck, 2008) was used to 
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estimate the precision of tracking and the guessing rate. We hypothesised that the 
magnitude of tracking error and proportion of guessing would be lower, and the precision of 
tracking would be higher for the higher priority targets in all three experiments indicative of 
strategic unequal attention allocation.  
 
 
2.3 Experiment 1 
 
Experiment 1 aimed to overcome the limitations that were present in the pilot 
experiment.The error between the actual and estimated trajectory was used as a 
continuous measure of tracking accuracy and Zhang and Luck’s (2008) distributional analysis 
was used to estimate the proportion of guess trials, and the precision of the tracked targets.  
Participants were explicitly told the percentage of attentional resource that they should 
attempt to allocate to a given target at the start of each trial.  
 
2.3.1 Method 
 
Participants. Twenty-seven undergraduate students from the University of Bristol 
participated in return for course credit. G*Power version 3.1 (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & 
Buchner, 2007) was used to calculate sample size for all experiments. Based on existing data 
from our lab suggesting an effect size of dz = 0.73 for comparison between targets with a 
25% and 75% likelihood of being probed, this sample size gave us a 95% chance of observing 
a similar effect size, with alpha set at .05 for two-tailed tests.  
 
Design. Target priority was manipulated in a within-subject design with three levels: low 
(25%), equal (50%), and high (75%) which reflected the veridical probability of a target being 
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queried over the course of the whole experiment. The primary dependent variable was 
magnitude of angular error, indexed by the degree of error from the queried target’s actual 
trajectory (i.e. the direction it was heading in) to the participant’s reported trajectory at the 
end of the trial. For example, if at the final moment of the moving tracking display, the 
queried target was last moving upwards and rightwards at an angle of 10 degrees clockwise 
from vertical, and the participants reported that it was moving directly upwards, then this 
would constitute a magnitude of angular error of 10 degrees. The proportion of guess trials 
and precision of representations calculated from the mixture modelling analysis were also 
dependent variables.  
 
Procedure. The trajectory tracking task was used. At the start of the trial, each target had 
one of three numbers (25, 50, 75) presented on them denoting the likelihood of this target 
being queried at the end of a trial and so indicating the relative importance of each target 
(i.e. the 75 and 25 targets were of high and low priority respectively). On any given trial, the 
combined values totalled 100. Participants were given clear instructions and the opportunity 
to ask questions on how to allocate their attention before starting the practice trials. 
Participants completed 10 practice trials followed by 250 experimental trials, the order of 
which was randomised, in 10 blocks. The experiment lasted approximately 1 hour. 
2.3.2 Results and Discussion 
One participant was excluded due to their very high magnitude of error (and the 
model-based analysis suggested they had a very high rate of guessing). LME analysis was 
used. Target priority was entered into the model as a fixed effect. As random effects, there 
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was a random intercept for subjects and a by-subject random slope for the effect of target 
priority.   
 
There was a main effect of priority, χ2 (2) = 16.60, p < .001, whereby the magnitude 
of angular error decreased as target priority increased, b = -0.277, SE = 0.06, t = 4.42. Post-
hoc tests showed that there was a higher magnitude angular error in the low priority than 
equal priority condition (b = -0.48, t = 3.53, p = .006), but no difference between the equal 
and high priority conditions (b = -0.08, t = 1.65, p = .236) (see Figure 2.1, left panel). 
 
Figure 2.1. Mean magnitude of error, proportion of guessing and precision of tracking for 
each target priority in Experiment 1. Error bars represent 95% within-subject confidence 
intervals using Morey (2008). 
 
It is possible to interpret the distribution of error magnitudes in order to examine 
the data further. This analysis distinguishes contributions from two sources to differences in 
overall accuracy. The first source is the guessing rate, where guesses may be due to 
participants losing track or otherwise completely withdrawing attention from a target. The 
second is the precision of representations (due to the amount of allocated attention) of 
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targets4. Analysing data from a series of MOT experiments in which participants judged the 
heading of a target object, Horowitz and Cohen (2010, following Zhang & Luck, 2008) used a 
mixture of a uniform distribution (representing the situation where a target is lost and 
participants must guess) and von Mises (the circular equivalent of the normal distribution), 
representing the situation where participants have successfully tracked a target, but with 
varying precision, as reflected in the spread of the distribution). Under a pure slot-based 
model the precision should not change as set size increases to any level (since a fixed 
number of slots are allocated, and targets that are not tracked are guessed, which is 
captured under the uniform guessing distribution). Flexible accounts predict that precision 
should decrease as the number of items increases for any set size increase. Horowitz and 
Cohen also tested two hybrid models (again following Zhang & Luck, 2008): the slots + 
resources model (a fixed number of slots, but a resource that can be unequally allocated 
among those slots) and the slots + averaging model (a fixed number of slots, but slots can 
be applied to more than one target if below capacity). Both hybrid models make the same 
prediction however: if the number of targets to track is below capacity the precision will 
decrease as the number of targets increase (either because resources are spread more 
thinly, or because slots cannot be shared) and asymptote if capacity is reached (as 
additional targets are not tracked and are guessed, which is captured under the uniform 
guessing distribution).  
 
In line with the method used by Horowitz and Cohen (2010), we fit a mixture of a 
uniform circular distribution and von Mises distribution to each participants’ data for each 
                                                                
4 We thank H. Meyerhoff for suggesting this analysis.  
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level of priority. We used the fitdistr function from the ‘MASS’ package (Venables & Ripley, 
2002) with von Mises and uniform distributions functions from the ‘circular’ package 
(Agostinelli & Lund, 2017). The uniform circular distribution, representing the situation 
where a participant makes a guess response, generates a random value between -180 to 
180. The von Mises distribution, representing the situation where a participant has tracked 
a target, but to a varying degree of precision, is controlled by two parameters: μ (the mean) 
and κ (the concentration parameter, which determines the spread of the distribution). The 
mixture of guessing and tracked errors was controlled by PG, the proportion of guessing. The 
error distribution, ε, is therefore: 
 
𝜀 = 𝑃𝐺𝑓𝑢𝑐(−180,180) + (1 − 𝑃𝐺)𝑓𝑉𝑀(𝜇, 𝜅),    (1) 
 
In which fuc is the uniform circular distribution function and fvm is the von Mises distribution 
function. In our analysis (following Horowtiz & Cohen, 2010) we fixed μ = 0 (i.e. average 
error was zero). We used R (R Core Team, 2015) to estimate κ and PG values via maximum 
likelihood estimation function fitdistr from the MASS package (Venables & Ripley, 2002) 
with von Mises and uniform distributions functions from the ‘circular’ package (Agostinelli & 
Lund, 2017). The mixture model fits (for data combined across participants), for each level 
of target priority, are shown in Figure 2.2). A higher concentration value, κ, demonstrates 
higher precision.   
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Figure 2.2. Mixture model fits for the combined data across participants for Experiment 1 
for each level of target priority. The density plot displays the actual data and the black line 
shows the model fit. The proportion of guessing (PG) and precision of tracking (κVM) 
parameters are also detailed.   
 
 
The κ and PG values, estimated for each participant and each level of priority, were 
then entered into a LME analysis, in an identical manner to the treatment of the magnitude 
of angular error scores. There was an effect of target priority on the proportion of guessing, 
χ2 (2) = 11.10, p = .004. Participants demonstrated less guessing for high priority targets, b = 
-0.002, SE = 0.001, t = 3.52. There was evidence for a higher proportion of guessing in the 
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low priority compared to the equal priority condition, (b = -0.004, t = 0.32, p = .021). 
However, there was no difference in the proportion of guessing in the high compared with 
equal condition, (b = -0.004, t = 1.65, p = .950) (see Figure 2.1, right panel).  
 
Finally, there was an effect of target priority on the precision of representations (κ), 
χ2 (2) = 10.52, p = .005, with the precision increasing as target priority increased, b = -0.09, 
SE = 0.03, t = 3.42 (see Figure 2.1, right panel). Post-hoc tests showed that there was no 
difference in precision between any of the adjacent levels of target priority (both t < 2.12 , p 
> .127).  
 
This experiment showed that participants guessed the trajectory of the low priority 
target more frequently than both the equal and high priority target. Howard, Rollings, and 
Hardie (2017) showed that participants’ attention to a target’s position and its motion 
characteristics are distinct. Therefore, it cannot be assumed that all guess trials were 
associated with participants having no attention on that target. However, it could be argued 
that the higher proportion of guessing for low priority targets indicates participants could 
not split attention unequally and, therefore sometimes either lost the target completely (i.e. 
dropped the target) or confused it with a distractor (i.e. swapped the target with a 
distractor). However, this is likely an infrequent occurrence given the relatively low 
proportion of guessing (the majority of trials not modelled as involving a guess response) 
and a relatively good level of tracking accuracy (indexed by the magnitude of angular error) 
for the low priority target. This indicates that some attention was allocated to the low 
priority target but, in some cases, this was not sufficient to support updating of a targets’ 
trajectory which resulted in an increase in guessing.  
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 The effect of target priority on magnitude of error and precision shows that 
differential amounts of attention were allocated to the high and low priority targets, 
respectively, indicative of unequal attention allocation. This suggests some flexibility to the 
attentional resource underlying tracking. Specifically, more attention is allocated to the high 
priority target which leads to a lower magnitude of error and higher precision. This finding 
does not fit with slot-based accounts of attention allocation which would predict that the 
magnitude of angular error and precision of representations would remain constant 
because each target is allocated one slot. Flexible and hybrid models can, however, account 
for these findings because under their assumptions attention is unequally distributed 
between the two targets resulting in differences in the three indexes of tracking accuracy.  
 
This experiment does not provide insight into how fine-grained this ability is. The 
extent to which attention splitting is fine-grained refers to the precision with which a 
division of attention is possible, in an analogous fashion to the way that liquid water makes 
splitting infinitely more fine-grained than crushed ice or ice cubes. Experiment 2 therefore 
examined whether participants can split their attention unequally across two targets with 
smaller disparities in their priority (e.g. 40% vs 60%) than used in Experiment 1 (i.e. 25% vs 
75%). Exploring the extent to which attention is fine-grained has the potential to distinguish 
between different models of MOT. In fixed models attention can only be split unequally in a 
finite number of ways (i.e. 4-0; 3-1; 3-2). In contrast, under flexible accounts, there is an 
unlimited number of ways that attention can be split.  
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2.4 Experiment 2 
 
Experiment 2 further investigated to what extent participants can finely split their attention 
unequally across multiple moving objects. We manipulated the target priorities at finer 
increments (70, 60, 50, 40, and 30) than Experiment 1 to enable investigation of the 
precision with which participants could allocate a pre-specified amount of the attentional 
resource to a given target. We conducted two identical studies, but one was completed in a 
single participant testing environment (i.e. each participant completed the study alone) and 
another was completed in a group testing environment (i.e. participants completed the 
study in a group of approximately 20 participants). For brevity and power, we present the 
combined data from these studies5.  
 
2.4.1 Method 
 
Participants. Seventy-nine undergraduate students from the University of Bristol 
participated in return for course credit (single testing = 36 participants6; group testing = 43 
participants). Based on existing data from our lab suggesting an effect size of dz = 0.54 for 
comparison between targets with a 50% and 60% likelihood of being probed, we powered 
for a similar effect size of d = 0.5. This gave us at least an 80% chance of observing a similar 
effect size, with alpha set at .05, based on two-tailed tests, for each independent method of 
testing (i.e. single and group testing power calculations were calculated separately). 
                                                                
5 The same qualitative pattern of results was observed when each experiment was analysed independently. 
When experiment was included as a between subject factor there were no reliable differences. Note, under a 
Bayesian framework combining the data is equivalent to multiplying the Bayes factors from each experiment 
(assuming the posterior from Experiment 1 is the prior for Experiment 2; see Ly, Etz, Marsman, Wagenmakers, 
2018). 
6 Maria Antoniou and Veronika Hadjipanayi assisted with data collection.  
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Design. Target priority was manipulated in a within-subject design with five levels: very low 
(30), low (40), equal (50), high (60), very high (70), and reflected the true likelihood of a 
target being queried over the course of the whole experiment. The dependent variables 
were the same as in Experiment 1. 
 
Procedure. The procedure was identical to that used in Experiment 1 apart from, when 
providing their response, participants had to indicate whether they thought they were 
tracking the queried target at the end of the trial or not by clicking the left mouse button for 
‘tracked’ and the right mouse button for ‘not tracked’ (labels were put on the mouse 
buttons) 7. This click also activated the response indicator line. Participants then used the 
same mouse button to finalise their response as detailed in Experiments 1. In the group 
testing experiment stimuli were presented in a 1,024 x 768 pixels window of a 21-inch LCD 
monitor (1920 x 1080 resolution) with a refresh rate of 60Hz. 
 
2.4.2 Results and Discussion 
 
Two participants were removed from the analysis because their overall magnitude of 
error was very high (and the model-based analysis suggested they had very high levels of 
guessing). The LME analysis and post-hoc comparisons used were identical to Experiment 1.  
 
                                                                
7 We do not include analysis of this aspect of the design as so few participants actively engaged with it, but 
note the same qualitative pattern of results was observed when ‘untracked’ trials were excluded. 
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There was an effect of target priority on the magnitude of angular error, χ2 (2) = 
121.49, p < .001, which decreased as target priority increased, b = -0.467, SE = 0.04, t = 
12.20 (see Figure 2.3, left panel). Post-hoc tests showed no difference in the magnitude of 
angular error between the very low and low priority condition (b = -0.13, t = 0.14, p = .639). 
Magnitude of angular error was higher in the low compared with equal (b = -0.90, t = 6.49, p 
< .001), equal compared with high (b = -0.29, t = 2.50, p = .049), and high compared with 
very high priority conditions (b = -0.42, t = 5.40, p < .001), respectively.  
 
 
Figure 2.3. Mean error in magnitude of error, proportion of guessing and precision of 
tracking for each target priority in Experiment 2. Error bars represent 95% within-subject 
confidence intervals using Morey (2008).  
 
Figure 2.4 shows the mixture model fits all the data combined for all participants, for 
each level of target priority. Fitting the models to each individual participant showed that 
there was an effect of priority on the proportion of guesses (Pg), χ2 (2) = 43.65, p < .001 
(Figure 2.3, right panel). Participants demonstrated less guessing for higher priority targets, 
b = -0.003, SE = 0.001, t = 6.85. Post-hoc comparisons revealed no difference in the 
proportion of guessing between the very low and low priority targets (b = -0.001, t = 0.39, p 
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= .923). Proportion of guessing was higher for the low compared with equal priority targets 
(b = -0.006, t = 3.58, p = .003). However, there was no difference between the equal and 
high priority targets, (b = -0.001, t = 0.69, p = .787). Lower proportion of guessing was 
revealed in the very high compared with high priority condition (b = -0.005, t = 4.95, p < 
.001). 
 There was also evidence for an effect of target priority on the precision of 
representations κ, χ2 (2) = 27.59, p < .001, with precision increasing as target priority 
increased (b = 0.15, SE = 0.03, t = 5.18) (see Figure 2.3, right panel). There was no difference 
in precision between the very low and low, equal and high, and high and very high priority 
targets (t < 1.86, p > .184). There was, however, higher precision in the equal compared with 
low priority condition, b = 0.25, t = 0.11, p = .026. 
Figure 2.4. Mixture model fits for all participants for Experiment 2 for each level of target 
priority. The density plot displays the actual data and the black line shows the model fit. The 
proportion of guessing (PG) and precision of tracking (κVM) parameters are also detailed.   
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 In line with Experiment 1, the effect of target priority on the magnitude of angular 
error and proportion of guessing suggests that participants can split attention unequally. 
Specifically, more attention was allocated to the high priority target leading to a lower 
magnitude of error, and overall a lower proportion of guessing. Taken together, this result 
suggests flexible allocation of the attentional resource and, therefore, does not fit with pure 
slot-based accounts of attention allocation which would predict no effect of target priority 
because, under this account, each target is allocated a single slot.  
 
Experiment 2 explored the extent to which attention splitting is fine-grained, namely 
the precision with which attention can be divided. There was some evidence for fine-
grained spitting because there was a difference in magnitude of angular error and 
proportion of guessing for the high and very high targets. However, there was no evidence 
for a difference in these parameters between the very low and low priority targets. Since 
there was only limited evidence for fine-grained splitting, the results cannot distinguish 
between flexible and hybrid models of attention. No difference in tracking performance 
between the very low and low priority targets could be taken as evidence for a slots + 
averaging model of attention in which three and one slot(s) were allocated to the high and 
low priority target respectively, on any given trial thus resulting in the same pattern of 
results for the both the unequal splitting condition (i.e. high and low). However, better 
tracking performance in the very high compared with high pattern fits with a flexible or slots 
+ averaging model which would predict a graded decrease in magnitude of angular error 
and proportion of guessing as target priority increases.  
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 Experiments 1 and 2 demonstrated unequal attention splitting in a trajectory 
tracking task. Since position tracking does not automatically recruit trajectory tracking 
processing during MOT it has been suggested that position tracking may be a more primary 
representation during the process of tracking (Howard, Rollings, & Hardie, 2017). To further 
explore the extent to which unequal attention splitting was possible within a MOT-
paradigm, we replicated Experiment 3 using a position tracking task. This was anticipated to 
provide more insight into the fine-grained nature of attention splitting.  
 
2.5 Experiment3 
 
Experiment 3 examined whether participants could allocate attention unequally using a 
different measure of tracking accuracy, to further generalise our findings. Tracking 
performance in Experiment 3 was indexed by the magnitude of spatial error from the 
correct final position of the queried target to the participant’s reported final position of the 
queried target. More specifically, we used the x,y co-ordinates of the target’s centre to 
index the actual final location and the x,y co-ordinates of the participant’s click to index 
their position reports.   
2.5.1 Method 
 
Participants. Forty undergraduate students from the University of Bristol participated in 
return for course credit. Based on existing data from our lab suggesting an effect size of dz 
= 0.66 for comparison between targets with a 40% and 50% likelihood of being probed, we 
powered for a similar effect size of d = 0.5 which gave us at least an 80% chance of 
observing a similar effect size, with alpha set at .05 for two-tailed tests.  
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Design. Target priority was manipulated in a within-subject design with five levels: very low 
(30), low (40), equal (50), high (60), very high (70), and reflected the true probability of a 
target being queried over the course of the whole experiment. The dependent variable was 
the magnitude of error (pixels) from the correct final location of the queried target to the 
participant’s reported final location of the queried target.  
 
Procedure. The task was identical to that used in Experiment 2 (group participation 
condition) apart from the substitution of the trajectory tracking task with the position 
tracking task. Anaural prompt instructed participants to localise the target (i.e. click the 
location on the screen where they thought the centre of queried target with the priory 
stated through the headphones was) at the end of the movement. In the 50/50 conditions, 
the two targets were labelled with either an ‘X’ or ‘Y’ at the start of the trial and participants 
were cued at the end of the trial using these labels.  
 
2.5.2 Results and Discussion 
 
The LME analysis used was identical to Experiment 2. One participant was excluded 
from the analysis because their overall magnitude of error was very high (and the model-
based analysis suggested they had very high levels of guessing). All trials on which the size of 
distance error was greater than 605 pixels was excluded. This value was chosen as it 
represented the 95th percentile of the data and the density plots showed less uniform 
responding thereafter. 
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There was an effect of target priority on the size of the distance error, χ2 (2) = 67.97, 
p < .001, with distance error decreasing as target priority increased, b = -1.75, SE = 0.20, t = 
8.91. Post-hoc comparisons showed evidence for smaller distance errors in the high 
compared with equal condition, (b = -1.67, t = 2.65, p = .040), and equal compared with low 
priority condition (b = -2.99, t = 3.80, p = .002) (see Figure 2.5, left panel). There was also 
evidence for smaller error distances in the very high compared with high condition, (b =-
1.06, t = 3.10, p = .014). There was no evidence for a difference in tracking error between 
the very low priority and the low priority condition, b = -0.72, t = 1.31, p = .430. 
 
Figure 2.5. Mean error in size of position error, proportion of guessing and scale of 
distribution for each target priority in Experiment 3. Error bars represent 95% within-subject 
confidence intervals using Morey (2008).  
 
 In order to fit the data from Experiment 3, we used a different mixture distribution 
analysis because the error data distribution was linear and positively skewed. We used a 
Weibull distribution for the tracked items and a uniform distribution (from 0 to 605) for the 
guessing distribution. The dweibull function used in the analysis of is part of the base 
distribution package ‘stats’ (R Core Team, 2015). The Weibull has the advantage that both 
the shape and scale can vary, and can approximate other distributions, including the 
normal.  The error distribution, ε, is therefore: 
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𝜀 = 𝑃𝐺𝑓𝑈(L =0, 𝑈 = 605) + (1 − 𝑃𝐺)𝑓𝑊𝐵(𝜂, 𝛽),     (2) 
in which Pg is the guessing rate, L and U are upper and lower bounds for the uniform 
distribution function fU, and 𝜂 and 𝛽 are the scale and shape of the Weibull distribution 
function, fWB. Figure 2.6 shows the mixture model fit to the combined data from all 
participant for each level of priority. As is evident in the plots, the scale parameter 𝜂 is 
capturing the spread of the data, which we interpret as the precision of tracked items.  
 
Figure 2.6. Mixture model fits for all data combined across participants for Experiment 3 for 
each level of target priority. The histogram plot displays the actual data and the black line 
shows the model fit. The proportion of guessing (PG) precision of tracking (𝛽 the Weibull 
shape), and scale (𝜂) parameters are also detailed.    
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There was an effect of priority on the proportion of guesses, χ2 (2) = 44.18, p < .001. 
Participants demonstrated less guessing for high priority targets, b = -0.004, SE = 0.001, t = 
6.40 (see Figure 2.5, right panel). Post-hoc comparisons showed evidence for a lower 
proportion of guessing in the high compared with equal condition, (b = -.005, t = 4.87, p < 
.001), and equal compared with low priority condition, (b = -.007, t = 3.68, p < .003). There 
was also evidence for lower proportion of guessing in the very high compared with high 
condition, (b = -.0.003, t = 2.81, p = .027). There was, however, no evidence for a difference 
in the proportion of guessing between the very low priority and the low priority condition, b 
= .002, t = 0.51, p = .819. 
 
There was no evidence for an effect of target priority on the shape, as measured by 
𝛽, of representations, χ2 (2) = 0.71, p = .701. There was, however, evidence for an effect of 
target priority on scale, as measured by,  , χ2 (2) = 23.34, p < .001. As target priority 
increases, the distribution become more concentrated, b = 1.25, SE = 0.25, t = 5.02 (see 
Figure 2.5, right panel). Post-hoc comparisons revealed evidence for increased 
concentration for the low compared with very low priority condition, b = 4.79, t = 3.37, p = 
.007. There was greater concentration in the equal compared with low priority condition, b 
= -1.31, t = 2.75, p = .030, and high compared with equal, respectively, b = 0.17, t = 1.17, p = 
.004. The distribution for the very high compared with high priority targets was also more 
concentrated b = 0.22, t = 1.15, p < .001. 
 
Overall, the position tracking task revealed evidence for unequal attention allocation 
which cannot be accounted for by fixed, slot-based models of attention. There was some 
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evidence for more fine-grained attention allocation for the higher priority, with a smaller 
size of position error and lower proportion of guessing in the very high compared with high 
priority condition. There was, however, no evidence for fine-grained splitting for the lower 
priority targets (i.e. 30 vs 40). This pattern of results is similar to Experiment 2 with 
participants not differentiating between allocating their attention to a very low and low 
priority target.  
 
2.6 General Discussion 
 
In a series of three experiments, participants ability to split attention unequally 
between multiple moving objects was investigated. Results from all experiments revealed 
some evidence for unequal attention allocation according to strategic top-down control. 
This is in line with the existing literature documenting top-down, goal driven attention 
allocation in MOT (Brockhoff & Huff, 2016) and visual search (Jiang, Sha, & Remington, 
2015). Such findings replicate research demonstrating unequal attention allocation during 
MOT in response to instructions, (Yantis, 1992; Cohen, et al., 2011) further supporting the 
efficacy of using goal-directed instructions to manipulate participants’ attention allocation 
(Miller & Bonnel, 1994; Fitousi, 2016).  
 
 In Experiments 1, 2, and 3,, the proportion of guessing decreased as target priority 
increased. Guessing in response to a prompt to report one aspect of a target cannot be 
equated with a complete withdrawal of attention to all other aspects of that target, since 
for example, position and trajectory encoding for targets appear to be distinct processes 
(Howard, Rollings, & Hardie, 2017). Therefore, for any given modelled guessing response, 
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this may not necessarily indicate a complete withdrawal of attention to that target if its 
trajectory (Experiments 1 and 2) or its position (Experiment 3) is not known. Even if the 
participant has completely withdrawn attention from a target, there are two possible 
reasons that could lead a participant to produce a guess response. They could drop the 
target (i.e. lose track of it) or swap the target (i.e. confuse it with a distractor). We propose 
that a combination of these events occur more frequently in the low priority condition than 
the high priority condition because less attention is allocated to the low priority target 
which constitutes unequal attention allocation. It could be argued that the increased 
proportion of guessing for low priority targets compared to high priority targets reflects 
participants’ inability to split attention unequally. Specifically, participants may have 
dropped the low priority target on some trials and, therefore on those occasions, performed 
single object tracking which could be responsible for an increase in the precision for the 
high-priority target. This is unlikely because the guessing rate and magnitude of error is 
relatively low across all experiments and indicates non-guessing responses for the lower 
priority of targets on the majority of trials. Using electrophysiological markers and 
behavioural experiments, Drew, Horowitz, and Vogel (2013) distinguished between 
swapping and dropping trials. The relative frequency of these events is not distinguishable in 
the current data and, therefore, research using such measures within an unequal splitting 
MOT paradigm is required.  
 
 Experiments 1, 2, and 3 assessed how fine-grained unequal attention allocation is. 
The results from these experiments indicate that, on a given trial, participants can allocate 
more and less attention to the high and low priority targets, respectively. However, the 
results were less conclusive with regard to how fine-grained such attention splitting is. 
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There was some evidence for fine-grained splitting at higher levels of priority (e.g. between 
60 and 70) but not at the lower end of the priority range (e.g., 30 and 40). Perhaps 
participants could not distinguish between what constitutes 30% and 40% of their 
attentional resource or were not sufficiently motivated by the task (participants were 
undergraduate students completing the experiment for course credit) to make the 
distinction, and so operated according to a binary ‘more’ or ‘less’ mechanism. Alternatively, 
it is possible that 30% of the attentional resource was sufficient to accurately track the very 
low priority targets and, therefore, the task was not sensitive enough to distinguish 
between highly similar target priorities. However, the effect of priority on proportion of 
guessing demonstrates that participants did guess on some trials and, therefore, 30% of the 
resource is not always sufficient. It is also important to recognise that the response 
procedure used in our experiments is different to the typical MOT literature in which 
participants must indicate whether a probed object is a target or non-target, which may 
have contributed to participants adopting different tracking strategies. However, trajectory 
and position tracking have been previously shown to be appropriate and sensitive measures 
of tracking performance which decline with set size (Horowitz & Cohen, 2010; Howard, 
Rollings & Hardie, 2017).  
 
A persistent debate in the literature surrounds the structure of the attentional 
resource underlying tracking. Results from all experiments suggest that participants can split 
attention unequally indicating some flexibility to the attentional resource. This does not fit 
with fixed architecture theories of tracking which would predict that each target is allocated 
one slot, and, therefore, there would be no difference in tracking performance. Findings 
from Experiment 2 and Experiment 3 regarding the fine-grained nature of attention splitting 
 
56 
 
are less conclusive. There is some evidence that participants may be able to only split 
according to a binary mechanism (i.e. high and low priority) which fits with slots + averaging 
models which assume that more than one slot can be allocated to a high priority target. In 
both the unequal attention splitting conditions (i.e. 30/70; 40/60) three slots and one slot 
can be allocated to a high and low priority target respectively and therefore no difference in 
tracking accuracy is observed. Under this account, no further precision in unequal splitting 
would be observed, since the slots cannot be subdivided any further, and therefore, this 
model explains the data presented here. Experiment 2 revealed evidence for a difference in 
magnitude of angular error and proportion of guessing which indicates fine-grained 
attention allocation. This fits with pure flexible and slots + resources models which predict a 
graded increase in tracking performance measures as target priority increases. Further 
research is needed to distinguish between these accounts.  
 
Our results fit most closely with hybrid models of attention allocation. Pure flexible 
accounts require an additional assertion that not only can the resource be divided in a fine-
grained manner, but that this fine-grained allocation of the resource can be divided out 
unequally between targets. A relevant analogy here might be the division of pay between 
workers: if forty units (dollars, euros, etc.) of currency are to be shared between four 
workers, the fixed account would suggest that there are four ten-unit notes which can be 
shared out, where a flexible account would suggest that there are in fact 4,000 subunits 
(e.g. cents) to be shared out. The flexible account asserts that this sum could be divided 
amongst 4,000 workers (actually an infinite number, but this requires subdivision of cents 
into electronic payments of less than one cent for the purpose of this analogy). However, 
the flexible account has so far been silent on whether or not this payment could be made 
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unequally between workers, with some receiving more than others. The evidence we 
present here suggests that this is the case, that attention can be flexibly and unequally 
divided. How this unequal splitting of attention is achieved by the visual system does, 
however, warrant further theoretical consideration in the MOT literature. 
 
The guessing rate remained relatively low throughout, indeed the mean guessing 
rate for the lowest priority targets across Experiments 2 and 3 was 29%. This is important 
because it suggests that on the majority of trials, participants did not appear to adopt the 
strategy of only single object tracking the high priority target, in which case we might expect 
nearer a 100% guess rate for the lower priority target. However, the results reported were 
averaged across trials and so it is possible that participants did not attempt to track multiple 
objects on each and every trial. Specifically, it is possible that participants engaged in single 
object tracking and used target priority to determine the number of trials on which they 
tracked only the high or low reward target. However, this is unlikely because there were 
only two targets which is below the proposed four object capacity limit for tracking. 
Whereas examining within-trial behaviour was not the main focus of this article, future 
research should focus on how participants achieve this unequal splitting.  One way to 
directly investigate this would be by probing both targets at the end of a trial to gain insight 
into the relationship between tracking accuracy on the two simultaneously presented 
targets.  A positive correlation between tracking performance would indicate that 
participants were engaging in multiple object tracking because performance on a given trial 
is broadly either good or bad for both targets. A negative correlation would indicate that 
participants were engaging in single object tracking because, as accuracy on one target (i.e. 
the tracked target) increases, accuracy on another target (i.e. the untracked target) 
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decreases. No correlation between performance on the two targets might be consistent 
with participants attention fluctuating within a trial and, therefore, tracking a single object 
at the cost of another. 
 
Although the studies presented indicate unequal attention allocation when 
performance is examined at the trial level, it is not possible to determine participants’ 
attention allocation during the trial. It is possible that participants were tracking one target 
at a time but switched between targets during the trial, spending relatively more time on 
higher priority targets.  Some have argued that attention is flexibly allocated in experiments 
investigating stimulus-driven unequal attention allocation (e.g. Iordanescu, Grabowecky, & 
Suzuki, 2009). Therefore, it is possible that prioritisation and unequal attention allocation 
only occurs when, for example, tracking becomes difficult such as in response to reduced 
inter-object spacing (Meyerhoff, Schwan, & Huff, 2018). Future research is therefore 
required to examine how attention is allocated at different points within a trial. One 
possible avenue is to use a dot probe detection task (e.g. Meyerhoff, Schwan, & Huff, 2018) 
in which probes are randomly presented within the tracking phase or two lateralised 
tracking areas are utilised to index attention allocation at different timepoints in a trial. Such 
research would also provide detail into the interplay between stimulus-driven and goal-
directed attentional mechanisms within MOT.  
 
A further consideration of the tasks we have used, is that equal and unequal 
attention splitting are potentially different tasks. Traditional MOT tasks might best be 
characterised primarily as an equal attention splitting task, although some have argued for 
unequal attention splits and attention reallocation in MOT (e.g. Iordanescu, Grabowecky, & 
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Suzuki, 2009). The unequal attention splitting MOT task used in these experiments also has 
a MIT component because participants must assign a target priority (a form of identity) to 
each of the targets. Identity encoding is not automatic during MOT (Pylyshyn, 2004; Scholl & 
Pylyshyn, 1999) and has been shown to require resources (Cohen, Pinto, Howe & Horowitz, 
2011), in part due to identity-location binding processes (Saiki, 2002; Oksama & Hyönä, 
2008). Future research should examine whether attention can be divided unequally in a 
purer MOT paradigm that does not require identity-location bindings. For example, distinct 
tracking areas or ‘cages’ (e.g. Howard and Holcombe, 2008) could be presented on each trial 
and each tracking area would be associated with a certain likelihood of being probed. This 
design would not require participants to maintain identity-location bindings because there 
would only be one target in each tracking area with, for example, three distractors. 
 
These data demonstrate that participants can split attention unequally in MOT tasks. 
These findings are not consistent with fixed, slot-based accounts of attention allocation. 
Pure flexible accounts could account for the results with the additional assumption that 
attention may be divided unequally between targets. Hybrid models, specifically the slots + 
averaging model, explains the data reported here without further assumptions because a 
single target can be allocated more than one slot when tracking is below capacity. There is, 
however, limited evidence that this ability is fine-grained. One possible explanation is that 
participants lacked motivation to fully engage with the task and/or could not gauge what 
30% of the attentional resource constituted which resulted in them splitting their attention 
according to a binary mechanism. To overcome these limitations alternative methods of 
prioritisation (e.g. reward) are required. Reward-based systems (e.g. point scoring, financial 
incentives) are more intuitive and have been shown to increase participants’ effort (e.g. 
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Friedman and Sunder, 1994; Roth, 1995, although see Bonner & Sprinkle, 2002, for a review 
of conflicting evidence). Chapter 3 therefore manipulated target-associated reward to 
examine its effect on tracking performance.  
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Chapter 3 Reward-based unequal attention allocation in position 
tracking 
 
3.1 Chapter Summary 
 
In three experiments, target associated reward was manipulated to examine the effect on 
tracking accuracy in a dual-target position tracking task. Reward was used to increase 
participants understanding of and engagement with the task, compared with Chapter 2. 
Experiment 4 queried participants on the final location of one target at the end of a given 
trial and revealed better tracking accuracy for higher compared with lower reward targets. 
Experiments 5 and 6 used a double-probe technique to explore the relationship in tracking 
accuracy between two targets. The final location of both targets was queried at the end of 
the trial to gain a measure of tracking accuracy for each target. A Tracking Accuracy 
Comparison (TAC) score was then obtained by calculating the difference in tracking accuracy 
between the two targets. Across both experiments, there was a main effect of reward, 
indexed by higher precision and lower magnitude of error and proportion of guessing for 
the high priority targets.  This supports unequal attention splitting, indicating some 
flexibility to the attentional resource. Experiment 5 showed no effect of the splitting 
condition (i.e. unequal splitting versus equal splitting) on TAC scores but did reveal an effect 
of response order on tracking accuracy, with worse performance for the second response. 
To eliminate the effect of response order, Experiment 6 used a touch screen but there was 
still evidence for poorer tracking accuracy for the second response, highlighting the role of 
memory in tracking, and no evidence for an effect of splitting condition on TAC scores.  
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3.2 Introduction 
 
Chapter 2 developed a novel MOT task to investigate unequal attention allocation. 
Across three experiments, using both trajectory- and position-tracking measures, results 
showed that the overall increase in tracking accuracy for higher priority targets was the 
result of a lower guessing rate and higher precision. These results provide insight into the 
nature of the attentional resource underlying tracking. Fixed theories suggest that there are 
a limited number of slots that support tracking (e.g. Pylyshyn, 1989) whereas flexible 
theories propose a continuous, flexible pool of resources (e.g. Alvarez & Franconeri 2007). 
Under a slot-based account, there should be no effect of priority on precision because a 
fixed number of slots are allocated to support tracking. Our results therefore fit more 
closely with flexible theories, that predict precision should increase as target priority 
increases. There was limited evidence for fine-grained splitting (i.e. unequal attention 
splitting at smaller differentials), which fits more closely with hybrid models of attention, 
which combine aspects of fixed and flexible models. Slots + averaging models argue that 
more than one slot can be allocated to a single target and could therefore explain the 
results as three slots and one slot being allocated to the low and high priority targets, 
respectively. Further research is needed to distinguish between these accounts.  
 
It is possible that methodological limitations contributed to limited evidence for fine-
grained splitting. Participants may not have understood the target priority instructions, not 
grasped the difference between 60% and 70% of one’s attention, or lacked motivation to 
engage with the task (participants were undergraduate students completing the experiment 
for course credit). Using reward as a goal-directed prioritisation strategy overcomes these 
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limitations because a point scoring system is more intuitive and monetary reward provides a 
motivation for performing well on the task.  
 
 Reward is a well-documented method for manipulating attention allocation 
(Anderson, 2013).  Kiss, Driver, and Eimer (2009) examined the effect of reward on event-
related potential signatures of visual selection. In a visual search task for colour singleton 
targets, two different colours were associated with high and low reward. Inverse efficiency 
(i.e. mean correct reaction time divided by the proportion of correct responses) was lower, 
indexing more efficient performance, for high-reward than for low-reward targets. 
Kristjánsson, Sigurjónsdóttir, and Driver (2010) examined the effect of reward on visual 
search performance and found higher search efficiency for high compared with low-reward 
targets. These studies show that reward can influence attention allocation.  
 
Reward is commonly used in the dual-task performance literature to examine 
whether two tasks share a common resource (e.g. Alvarez et al., 2005; Craik, Govoni, Naveh-
Benjamin & Anderson, 1996). The logic of this approach is that as the incentive to complete 
one task increases, the performance on the other task decreases if a shared resource is 
required. Morey, Cowan, Morey, and Rouder (2011) examined whether participants could 
choose the proportions of working memory (WM) resource to allocate to two tasks (i.e. one 
visual and one auditory) using a manipulation of financial payoffs. In one condition, there 
was a high reward for correct responses in one task and a low reward for the concurrent 
task. Results showed a trade-off between performance in the two tasks which indicates that 
WM could be flexibly divided between the two tasks in response to financial payoffs. A 
similar logic could be applied to the MOT literature to examine how the resource underlying 
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tracking, could be shared unequally between two distinct objects. More specifically, as the 
incentive to track one target increases, would tracking accuracy for that target increase at 
the expense of tracking accuracy for the other target? If so, this would indicate that a shared 
resource is utilised to track both targets and that it can be flexibly divided between the 
targets.  This study examined whether reward can motivate unequal attention distribution 
between simultaneously tracked objects in a MOT task. A reward structure was used in 
which each object was worth a different number of points and the highest scoring 
participants received immediate monetary rewards.  
 
3.3 Experiment 4 
 
Experiment 4 manipulated the amount of reward associated with a target to investigate 
whether participants could split their attention unequally between two moving objects in a 
reward-driven manner.  
 
3.3.1 Method 
 
Participants. Fifty-two undergraduate students from the University of Bristol participated in 
return for course credit (aged 18 – 35 years; 48 females, 4 males). Based on existing data 
from our lab suggesting an effect size of dz = 0.54 for comparison between targets with a 
50% and 60% likelihood of being probed, this sample size gave us at least an 80% chance of 
observing a similar effect size, with alpha set at .05 for two-tailed tests. 
 
Design. Reward was manipulated in a within-subject design with five levels: very low (30 
points), low (40 points), equal (50 points), high (60 points), very high (70 points). The more 
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points participants accumulated, the more likely they were to win a monetary prize. This 
reflected the number of points participants were awarded if they correctly localised a 
queried target. The dependent variable was tracking accuracy: the distance between the 
participant’s response (the x,y position of the mouse cursor when participants clicked the 
left mouse button) and the queried target’s centre. A successful localisation, in terms of 
rewarding the points to a participant, was defined as estimating the final location of the 
queried target within the diameter of the target’s final location. Because participants would 
rarely get the exact centre point of an object’s location, we reasoned that they would 
become demotivated unless we rewarded them for an approximately correct response. 
 
Materials and Procedure. Stimuli were presented in a 1,024 x 768 pixel window on a 21-inch 
LCD monitor (1920 x 1080 resolution) with a refresh rate of 60 Hz.  
 
The position tracking task was used. At the start of a trial, each target had a value (i.e. 30, 
40, 60, 70) presented on it denoting the number of points that would be awarded for 
successfully tracking that target (in all conditions the rewards totalled 100). In the 50-50 
condition, participants were instructed to split their attention equally between the two 
targets. In the 50/50 condition, an ‘X’ or ‘Y’ was presented instead of a numerical value to 
distinguish between the two objects at test. The disc representing the participants 
estimated final location of the target was also shown coloured green (i.e. scored the 
number of points associated with that target) or red (i.e. did not score points) depending on 
whether selected coordinates fell within the circumference of the target or not.  
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Participants were told that the aim of the task was to score the highest number of points. 
They were clearly instructed to not try and only track the most rewarded target (i.e. avoid 
single object tracking). Participants were told that there was a monetary reward for the 
highest (£15) and second highest (£10) scoring participant. Participants were tested in one 
of two group testing sessions, used to further motivate participants to engage in the task by 
introducing a competitive element (i.e. the highest performing participants in a given 
session received the monetary prizes). Participants completed 10 practice trials to 
familiarise themselves with the task, followed by 250 experiments trials, the order of which 
was randomised across 10 blocks. The experiment lasted approximately 1 hour.  
 
3.3.2 Results and Discussion 
 
Two participants were removed due to very high average errors and the mixture 
model analysis suggesting they were guessing on a disproportionate number of trials. LME 
analysis was used. Target reward was entered into the model as a fixed effect. As random 
effects, there was a random intercept for subjects and a by-subject random slope for the 
effect of target reward.  
 
There was a main effect of reward on magnitude of position error, χ2 (2) = 49.06, p < 
.001, whereby the magnitude of position error decreased as target reward increased, b = -
1.30, SE = 0.17, t = 7.46 (see Figure 3.1, left panel). Post-hoc comparisons showed that there 
was no difference in the size of error between either the very low and low reward targets (b 
= 0.74, t = 1.47, p = .175), or the low and equal reward targets (b = -1.49, t = 2.00, p = .147). 
Position errors were, however, smaller in the high priority condition compared with the 
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equal reward condition (b = -3.27, t = 5.85, p < .001). However, no differences were revealed 
between the high and very high reward condition (b = -0.09, t = 0.20, p = .190).  
Figure 3.1. Mean error in size of position error, proportion of guessing (black line) and scale 
(grey line) of distribution for each target priority in Experiment 4. Error bars represent 95% 
within-subject confidence intervals following Morey (2008).  
 
 Following Chapter 2, in order to estimate the guessing rate and precision parameters 
from the data, a mixture of a Weibull distribution (using the dweibull function, R Core Team, 
2015), for the tracked items error distribution (because the error data distribution was 
linear and positively skewed) and a uniform distribution (from 0 to 559 pixels, 559 pixels 
represented the 95th percentile of the error distribution) for the guessing distribution (see 
Chapter 2, for a detailed explanation and justification of distributions) was fitted. The 
Weibull has the advantage that both the shape and scale can vary, and can approximate 
other distributions, including the normal. The scale parameter 𝜂 captures the spread of the 
data, which we interpret as the precision of tracked items.  
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There was a main effect of reward on the proportion of guessing, χ2 (2) = 68.04, p < 
.001, whereby the proportion of guessing decreased as target reward increased, b = -0.004, 
SE = 0.004, t = 8.74 (see Figure 3.1, right panel, black line). Post-hoc comparisons showed 
that there was no difference in the proportion of guessing between the very low and low 
reward targets (b = -0.004, t = 1.87, p = .186). However, there was evidence for a lower 
proportion of guessing in the equal compared with low reward (b = -0.008, t = 4.27, p < 
.001), high compared with equal (b = -0.002, t = 3.09, p = .003), and high compared with 
very high reward targets (b = -0.001, t = 1.81, p = .029). 
 
There was evidence for an effect of target priority on precision, as measured by 𝜂, χ2 
(2) = 9.21, p < .001. As target reward increased the distribution became more concentrated, 
reflecting greater precision, b = -0.21, SE = 0.07, t = 3.07 (see Figure 3.1, right panel, grey 
line). Post-hoc comparisons showed no difference in precision between the very low and 
low reward targets (b = -0.29, t = 0.60, p = .836). There was evidence for increased 
concentration for the equal compared with the low (b = 0.36, t = 3.23, p = .009) and the high 
compared with the equal reward conditions (b = 0.19, t = 0.05, p = .002). There was no 
difference between the high and the very high reward conditions (b = 0.06, t = 0.68, p = 
.170). 
 
These results suggest that participants can allocate more and less attention to a high 
and low priority target, respectively, but there was limited evidence for fine-grained 
splitting. Although it is unlikely that participants struggled to understand the points scoring 
system, it is possible that the reward manipulation was still not sufficient to motivate 
participants to fully engage with the task. Some participants may have split according to a 
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binary high versus low strategy thus highlighting the role that strategy might exert on 
performance. Although the results are consistent with the interpretation that participants 
split attention unequally on each individual trial, we cannot rule out the possibility that 
participants split attention unequally across trials. Participants could have engaged in single 
object tracking on each trial and used reward to determine the number of trials on which 
they tracked only the high or low reward target. Alternatively, it could be argued that 
participants sometimes dropped a target (i.e. lost the target completely) and, on these 
occasions, performed single object tracking only. This criticism also applied to Chapter 2 
whereby participants may have probability matched across trials, and simply stopped 
tracking the low priority targets altogether. This is unlikely because the proportion of 
guessing remained low for all target rewards and there was a relatively good level of 
tracking accuracy, but our previous experiments cannot conclusively rule out this strategy. 
Experiment 5 therefore used a double-probe response procedure in which the final position 
of both targets was queried at the end of a given trial.  
 
3.4 Experiment 5 
 
Experiment 5 used a double-probe procedure to compare the relationship between tracking 
accuracy for two targets in a given trial and gain further insight into the extent to which 
participants can split their attention unequally between two moving targets. We obtained a 
Tracking Accuracy Comparison (TAC) score to quantify the difference in tracking accuracy 
between two targets. We hypothesised that the more unequal the attention split, the 
greater the TAC score would be. In equal splitting trials, we predicted that there would be 
no difference in TAC score because participants would allocate the same amount of the 
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attentional resource to both targets. In contrast, on unequal splitting trials, participants 
would allocate more attention to a high priority target resulting in a larger TAC score. To our 
knowledge, only Howard and Holcombe (2008) have used a double-probe procedure 
previously, although they used it to distinguish between the role of parallel and serial 
processing within MOT.  
3.4.1 Method 
 
Participants. Fifty-seven undergraduate students from the University of Bristol participated 
in return for course credit (aged 18 – 35 years; 43 females, 14 males). Based on existing data 
from our lab suggesting an effect size of dz = 0.66 for comparison between targets with a 
40% and 50% likelihood of being probed, this sample size gave us at least an 80% chance of 
observing a similar effect size of dz = 0.5, with alpha set at .05 for two-tailed tests. 
 
Design. Splitting condition was manipulated in a within-subject design with three levels: 
equal splitting (50:50), small unequal splitting (60:40), large unequal spitting (70:30). The 
double-probe procedure allowed us to examine within-trial behaviour. The primary 
dependent variable was a TAC measure. At the end of a trial, the final location of both 
targets was queried. Tracking accuracy for each target was obtained by calculating the 
distance between the participant’s response and the queried target’s centre. A TAC score 
was then obtained by calculating the difference in tracking accuracy between the two 
targets presented in the same trial.  
 
Materials and Procedure. The task and monetary incentives were identical to Experiment 4 
except for the method of denoting an equal-splitting trial. For all splitting conditions (i.e. 
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now including the equal-splitting trial), the number of points (i.e. 30, 40, 50, 60, 70) 
awarded for successfully localising a given target was presented. The response procedure 
required participants to localise both targets. Participants chose the order in which they 
localised the targets. Participants completed 10 practice trials, followed by 120 
experimental trials across 6 blocks. The total testing time was approximately 30 minutes. 
 
3.4.2 Results and Discussion  
 
We conducted similar LME analysis as Experiment 4, but with splitting condition 
(small, equal, large) entered into the model as a fixed effect. Regarding random effects, 
there was a random intercept for subjects and a by-subject random slope for the effect of 
splitting condition.   
 
There was no effect of splitting condition on TAC score, χ2 (2) = 0.18, p = .912. Since 
this did not fit with our hypothesis, we conducted an exploratory LME analysis investigating 
whether there was an effect of the order of response on the size of position error.  A model 
including a fixed effect of response order, fixed effect of target priority, a fixed response 
order*target reward interaction and a by-subject random slope in target reward was the 
best fit to the data. There was a main effect of reward (t = 3.84, p < .001), with a decrease in 
error with an increase in reward. There was also a main effect of response order (t = 0.70, p 
< .001), with larger errors for the second response. There was also an interaction (t = 2.94, p 
< .001), with a larger effect of response order observed for the more highly rewarded target 
(see Figure 3.2). Indeed when very high rewarded objects were responded to second, error 
rates were relatively high, counter to our expectations.  
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Figure 3.2.  Mean error in size of position error for the first and second response in 
Experiment 5. Error bars represent 95% within-subject confidence intervals following Morey 
(2008).  
 
 To investigate the proportion of guessing and precision of tracking for Response 1 
and Response 2, we used the same mixture distribution as in Experiment 5. The uniform 
distribution ranged from 0 – 438 pixels (i.e. 95th percentile for size of position error). It was 
not suitable to use this analysis to look at the effect of target reward for each order of 
response because each participant chose the order in which they responded and, therefore, 
there are very different numbers of data points in each response order for each level of 
reward for each participant. Moreover, due to the interaction between target reward and 
response order, it is not appropriate to collapse over response order. A paired samples t-
test showed that the proportion of guessing was higher for Response 2 (M = 0.17, SD = 0.14) 
than Response 1 (M = 0.09, SD = 0.07), t(56) = 4.45, p < .001, d = 0.66. There was also 
evidence for lower precision, indexed by the scale parameter, 𝜂, for Response 2 (M = 62.32, 
SD = 16.40) than Response 1 (M = 45.68, SD = 9.44), t(56) = 8.95, p < .001, d = 1.17. 
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 Figure 3.3 shows a scatterplot relating error magnitudes for the higher (60 and 70) 
and lower (30 and 40) reward targets on a given trial. We ran a correlation analysis to 
examine the within-trial performance to provide insight into attention splitting on any given 
trial. In line with Howard and Holcombe (2008), data were normalised such that the mean of 
the dataset for each participant was zero. There was no significant correlation between 
error magnitudes for the higher and lower priority targets (correlation coefficient = -0.002 
with 95% confidence intervals ± 0.029, N = 4,560, p = .868). The absence of a correlation is 
consistent with no relationship between tracking accuracy on the high and low priority 
target, respectively, on a given trial. This also suggests that, on most trials, participants did 
not engage in single object tracking, which would predict a strong negative correlation (i.e. 
as tracking accuracy on Target 1 increases, tracking accuracy on Target 2 decreases). 
Nevertheless, Figure 3.3 shows that, on some trials, participants could have engaged in 
single object tracking indicated by the L-shaped scatterplot, with each ‘arm’ representing a 
trial where tracking accuracy was high for one target and low for the other.  
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Figure 3.3.  Normalised errors in reporting the final location of the high and low reward 
target on a given trial in Experiment 5.  
 
Planned analysis revealed no effect of splitting condition on TAC and no correlation in 
the size of position error between the lower and higher reward targets. Since these findings 
contradict our hypothesis, we conducted exploratory analysis which revealed that response 
order introduced noise to the experiment, with the size of position error being larger for the 
second response. Interestingly, there was an effect of reward in this analysis, with a 
decrease in size in position error as target reward increased. The mixture modelling further 
supported this, with participants displaying a higher guessing rate and lower precision for 
the second response. This finding fits with that Howard and Holcombe (2008) who reported 
smaller error magnitudes for the first response compared with the second response. 
Because participants could choose which target they responded to first, it is possible they 
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selected the target they were most confident with first (in order to maximise reward). 
However, it is also possible that participant’s representation for the second target’s location 
degraded (either through memory decay or interference from the first response). In order to 
reduce the effects of memory decay by reducing the difference in response times (and any 
resulting performance decrements), Experiment 6 used a touch screen, allowing participants 
to respond more rapidly to both targets.  
 
3.5 Experiment 6 
 
3.5.1 Method 
 
Participants. Twenty-eight undergraduate and postgraduate students from the University of 
Bristol volunteered or participated in return for course credit (aged 18 – 35 years; 21 
females, 7 males). Based on existing data from our lab suggesting an average effect size of 
dz = 0.55 for comparison between targets with 50 points reward and 60 points reward, we 
required a sample size of 28 to achieve 80% power at an alpha of .05 to replicate this effect. 
 
Design. The design was identical to Experiment 5. 
 
Task and Procedure. The task and procedure were identical to Experiment 5 apart from 
participants gave their response using a 17” 3M M170 MicroTouch TFT touch screen 
monitor. Participants were instructed to rest their fingertips on two markers on the bottom 
left- and right-hand side of the screen in between-responding. The experimenter ensured 
compliance with this component of the task by watching participants as they completed the 
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task. This was to ensure participants were not tracking the targets with their fingers and 
reduce the time between a trial ending and participants pressing the screen.  
 
3.5.2 Results and Discussion 
 
The analysis was identical to Experiment 5. There was no effect of splitting condition 
on TAC scores, χ2 (2) = 4.08, p = .130. We therefore conducted an exploratory LME analysis 
to investigate whether the effect of response order persisted. A model including a fixed 
effect of response order, fixed effect of target priority, a fixed response order x target 
reward interaction and a by-subject random slope in target reward was the best fit to the 
data. There was a main effect of reward (t = 2.38, p = .018), with a decrease in size of 
position error for the high reward targets (see Figure 3.4). There was also a main effect of 
response order (t = 2.32, p = .021), with larger position errors for the second response (See 
Figure 3.4). There was, however, no evidence for an interaction, showing that the same 
overall pattern of results was observed for both first and second response.  
 
 
Figure 3.4. Mean error in size of position error for Response 1 and Response 2 in Experiment 
6. Error bars represent 95% within-subject confidence intervals using Morey (2008).  
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Since there was no interaction between response order and reward in Experiment 6, 
we collapsed across response order to allow investigation into the effect of reward on 
proportion of guessing and precision of tracking. The LME analysis was identical to 
Experiment 4. The uniform distribution ranged from 0 – 393 pixels (i.e. 95th percentile for 
size of position error). There was a main effect of reward on the proportion of guessing, χ2 
(2) = 8.67, p = .013, whereby the proportion of guessing decreased as target reward 
increased, b = -0.001, SE = 0.00, t = 3.02 (see Figure 3.5). Post-hoc comparisons showed that 
there was no difference in the proportion of guessing between the very low and low reward 
targets (b = -0.000, t = 0.04, p = .660). There was also no evidence for a lower proportion of 
guessing in the equal compared with low reward (b = -0.002, t = 0.83, p = .711). There was 
significant difference in precision for the high compared with equal (b = -0.002, t = 2.92, p = 
.024), and high compared with very high reward targets (b = -0.002, t = 2.58, p = .050). 
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There was evidence for an effect of target priority on precision, as measured by 𝜂, χ2 
(2) = 26.50, p < .001. As target reward increased the distribution became more 
concentrated, reflecting greater precision, b = -0.18, SE = 0.07, t = 2.52 (see Figure 3.5, right 
panel, grey line). Post-hoc comparisons showed no difference in precision between the very 
low and low reward targets (b = -0.16, t = 1.07, p = .570). There was no evidence for 
increased concentration for the equal compared with low (b = -0.33, t = 1.61, p = .291). 
There was limited evidence for increased concentration for the high compared with equal 
reward conditions (b = -0.15, t = 2.51, p = .059). There was no difference between the high 
and very high reward conditions (b = -0.03, t = 0.89, p = .676). 
Figure 3.5. Mean proportion of guessing and scale of distribution for each target reward in 
Experiment 6. Error bars represent 95% within-subject confidence intervals using Morey 
(2008). 
 
To investigate the proportion of guessing and precision of tracking for Response 1 
and Response 2, we used the same mixture distribution as in Experiment 5. The uniform 
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distribution for this analysis also ranged from 0 – 393 pixels (i.e. 95th percentile for size of 
position error).  A paired samples t-test showed that the proportion of guessing was higher 
for Response 2 (M = 0.15, SD = 0.17) compared with Response 1 (M = 0.07, SD = 0.08), t(27) 
= 4.07, p < .001, d = 0.54. There was also evidence for lower precision, indexed by the scale 
parameter, 𝜂, for Response 2 (M = 62.70, SD = 18.67) than Response 1 (M = 45.68, SD = 
9.21), t(27) = 6.41, p < .001, d = 1.05. This analysis further confirms the strong effect of 
response order on both the proportion of guessing and precision of tracking.  
 
Figure 3.6 shows a scatterplot relating error magnitudes for the high and low priority 
targets on a given trial. We ran the same correlation analysis as Experiment 5. There was no 
significant correlation between the high and low priority targets (correlation coefficient = -
0.008 with 95% confidence intervals ± 0.041, N = 2,240, p = .693).  
 
Figure 3.6.  Normalised errors in reporting the final location of the high and low reward 
target on a given trial in Experiment 6.  
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3.6 General Discussion 
 
In three experiments, we manipulated target-associated reward to investigate 
whether participants could split attention unequally. Position tracking was more accurate 
for high compared with low reward targets, indexed by smaller size of position errors, 
higher precision and a lower proportion of guessing. This demonstrates unequal attention 
allocation but there was no evidence for fine-grained attention splitting. These findings are 
in line with Chapter 2, which demonstrated unequal attention allocation driven by target 
priority. Moreover, we demonstrated the efficacy of using reward to induce unequal 
attention splitting, in line with the working memory literature (Morey et al., 2011).  
 
Experiment 4 used a standard position-tracking task in which participants reported 
the final position of a queried target. Results showed that participants’ tracking 
performance was better for the high, compared with low reward targets, indexed by smaller 
size of position errors, higher precision and a lower proportion of guessing. It could be 
argued that the high proportion of guessing and low precision revealed for the low priority 
target reflects participants’ inability to allocate attention unequally and, instead, 
participants were engaging in single object tracking. In line with Chapter 2, this is unlikely 
since the guessing rate remains relatively low across all target rewards. However, a 
limitation of the response procedure used in Experiment 4, and most published MOT 
research, is that participants are queried about the status or characteristics of only one 
object. This method provides no insight into the relationship between performance on two 
targets presented simultaneously on a given trial. 
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To gain insight into the relationship between performance on two targets presented 
simultaneously on a given trial, Experiments 5 and 6 used a double-probe procedure in 
which both targets were queried at the end of a given trial. We hypothesised that there 
would be an effect of the splitting condition on TAC. On equal splitting trials, we predicted 
that participants would allocate the same amount of attention to each target and, 
therefore, there would be a very small difference in tracking accuracy (i.e. a baseline). In 
contrast, when participants split their attention unequally, there would be a difference in 
tracking accuracy between the two targets. Specifically, in the 70-30 condition (i.e. large 
unequal split) we expected a larger difference in tracking accuracy than in the 60-40 
condition. Experiment 5 revealed no effect of splitting condition on the difference in 
tracking accuracy. Exploratory analysis revealed that there was an effect of response order 
on the size of position error, proportion of guessing and precision of a response. Specifically, 
participants performed worse when localising the second target. Although Experiment 6 
used a touch screen to reduce memory decay, a similar pattern of results was observed.  
 
The results, from Experiment 5 and 6, show that response order affected tracking 
accuracy, indexed by size of position error, precision, and proportion of guessing. Howard 
and Holcombe (2008) reasoned that different sources of imprecision would increase errors 
in both the first and second reported targets. Specifically, during the first report, 
participants must hold in memory the location of another target which could lead to 
interference. During the second report, participants must hold the location in memory for a 
longer period of time which could lead to decay due to the time delay or interference from 
thinking about and responding to the first target. Thornton and colleagues (2014, 2015) 
developed an interactive MOT (iMOT) task and showed that executing a motor action 
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relevant to the display did not impair tracking performance which suggests it is unlikely that 
the motor response contributed to poorer performance for the second response (although 
they used a different paradigm). Tripathy and Barrett (2004) developed a multiple trajectory 
tracking (MTT) task in which participants were required to monitor the trajectories of dots 
to detect deviations from linear trajectories and showed that performance dropped 
significantly when participants had to track two or more dots. Narasimhan, Tripathy, and 
Barrett (2009) showed a set-size effect in an MTT task, with a decrease in accuracy as the 
number of distractor trajectories increased. Since participants had to retrieve the first half 
of the trajectory to detect any deviations, Narasimhan, Tripathy, and Barrett (2009) 
suggested that poor tracking accuracy could be due to memory decay for the earlier 
trajectory. Introducing a delay of 400 ms between the first and second half of trajectories 
also resulted in poorer performance which further highlights a role of memory in MTT 
(Narasimhan, Tripathy, & Barrett, 2009). In subsequent work, Shooner, Tripathy, Bedell, and 
Öğmen (2010) used a direction-report MOT task in which participants had to report the 
direction of motion of a target after a brief delay. As time delay increased, there was a 
decrease in performance, further demonstrating a clear contribution of memory to MOT. 
Our results, demonstrating poorer performance for the second response, further implicate a 
role of memory within tracking.  
 
In Experiment 6, although participants could respond quicker, and in fact almost 
simultaneously (they could move both index fingers over both targets simultaneously), using 
the touch screen, the effect of response order remained. This finding has implications for 
real-world occupations. Traditional MOT tasks are atypical of the real world in which 
individuals distribute attention to objects in different locations within the visual field (i.e. 
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not just within a single computer screen). For example, in CCTV monitoring, attention must 
be allocated to several screens in distinct spatial locations, each with multiple moving 
objects on a given screen (e.g. 4 people). Since our results suggest that participants’ 
memory of the precise location of a given object decreases quickly, more research 
understanding the effect of time on memory decay within a MOT-like framework is required 
from both a theoretical and practical perspective.  
 
 Using the double-probe procedure enabled an investigation into the correlations 
between tracking accuracy on two targets presented simultaneously on a given trial. These 
analyses can provide insight into the role of serial versus parallel processing in tracking. 
Howard and Holcombe (2008) hypothesised that a negative correlation would support serial 
processing because, at a given time, attention is allocated to one target. In contrast, parallel 
processing accounts predict a positive correlation because attention is shared across targets 
simultaneously and therefore performance fluctuates across trials due to changes in general 
arousal. In line with Howard and Holcombe (2008), Experiment 5 and 6 revealed no 
evidence for a correlation suggesting that either a weaker form of serial processing or a 
combination of parallel and serial processing is used to support multiple object tracking.  
 
 It is important to acknowledge that, due to the reward manipulation in this task, 
participants may have adopted different strategies to maximise reward. For example, on 
trials in which one target was lost during tracking, participants may have made two 
responses close to the target they were successfully tracking in order to ensure they scored 
those points. Understanding the relationship between reward and decision-making, namely 
choosing a strategy one believes will result in maximum reward, is an interesting avenue for 
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further research in the MOT literature. Research has previously used eye-movements as an 
indicator for decision-making processes within a reward framework (Stritzke, 
Trommershäuser, & Gegenfurtner, 2009) which could be applied to the MOT literature to 
provide insight into the strategies adopted by participants by gaining insight into their 
scanning patterns both across- and within- trials. Alternatively, participants could be queried 
about any strategies that they used after completion of the experiment.   
   
 There is a continuing debate regarding the nature of the attentional resource 
underlying tracking. Our results largely replicate Chapter 2 and, therefore, provide support 
for a slots + averaging hybrid model of attention. There is evidence that participants can 
split attention unequally because there is a difference in tracking accuracy between the low 
and high priority targets which indicates flexibility to the attentional resource. However, 
there was limited evidence for fine-grained splitting which does not fit with pure flexible 
models of attention. We argue that the results could represent participants allocating one 
and three slots to the low and high priority target, respectively (i.e. slots + averaging 
models) which results in limited evidence for fine-grained splitting.  However, further 
experiments, which preclude such a 3:1 split will be needed to further test the validity of the 
slots + averaging model. 
 
Three experiments demonstrate participants’ ability to split attention unequally 
between two objects in a position-tracking task. Models of MOT must incorporate these 
findings which indicate a flexible component to attention allocation during tracking. We add 
to the limited literature using position tracking to index tracking accuracy within MOT 
frameworks and re-introduce the double-probe procedure (to our knowledge only Howard 
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& Holcombe, 2008, have used this to date in the tracking literature) which enables 
investigation into the relationship between tracking accuracy on two targets simultaneously 
presented. Experiments 5 and 6 highlight that the order with which participants respond to 
a target affects accuracy, and possibly the speed with which the spatial representation of a 
target decays. Further studies will be needed to disentangle to role of temporal decay and 
response interference in the response-order effect, which has both practical and theoretical 
implications.  
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Chapter 4 No evidence for attentional narrowing within a MOT 
framework 
 
4.1 Chapter Summary 
 
Chapter 4 investigated the effect of state anxiety on unequal attention splitting in an 
attempt to further distinguish between fixed and flexible accounts of attention allocation. 
Specifically the theory of attentional narrowing, which suggests that the attentional window 
narrows in anxiety-provoking situations, was tested. Attentional narrowing predicts that, 
under anxiety, participants would allocate more and less attention to the high and low 
target, respectively, in the unequal attention splitting MOT task. Experiment 7 aimed to 
induce cognitive anxiety, but the manipulation checks showed that it was unsuccessful. 
Therefore, Experiment 8 used a physiological anxiety induction technique, the 7.5% CO2 
challenge model, which was deemed successful at inducing anxiety. However, there was no 
evidence for attentional narrowing. Therefore, these experiments cannot further 
differentiate fixed and flexible accounts of tracking beyond Chapters 2 and 3.   
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4.2 Introduction 
 
MOT is commonly undertaken in occupations performed in pressurised and anxiety-
provoking environments such as the military, air traffic control, and sports. Morelli and 
Burton (2009) showed poorer MOT performance when participants viewed anxiety-inducing 
photographs compared to those who viewed neutral photographs, and Prinet and Sarter 
(2015) revealed a decrease in performance in a simplified air traffic control task (i.e. 
involved a tracking component) in anxiety-provoking situations. However, to date, no other 
research has investigated the effect of state anxiety8 on MOT, which highlights a paucity of 
data given the prevalence of occupations that require MOT, and are undertaken in anxiety-
provoking situations. Moreover, investigating the influence of anxiety on unequal attention 
spitting has the potential to inform the debate regarding the nature of the attentional 
resource that underlies MOT.  
 
Pressure, which refers to any factors that increase the importance of performing 
well, leads to the emotional state of the anxiety (Baumeister, 1984). Multidimensional 
models of anxiety distinguish between two components of anxiety: somatic and cognitive 
(Martens, Vealey, & Burton, 1990). Physiological anxiety9 refers to the physical symptoms of 
anxiety (e.g. increased heart rate, sweating, ‘butterflies’) whilst cognitive anxiety describes 
the emotions that characterise anxieties such as worry and apprehension (Krane, 1994; 
Martens, Vealey, & Burton, 1990). Spielberger, Gorsuch, Lushene, Vagg, and Jacobs (1983) 
distinguished between two types of anxiety: trait and state. Trait anxiety refers to a more 
                                                                
8 For the remainder of the chapter, anxiety is taken to mean state anxiety. When trait anxiety is being 
discussed, it will be fully specified.  
9 Physiological and somatic anxiety are used interchangeably in the literature. Physiological anxiety is used 
throughout this manuscript for consistency and clarity 
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stable, general predisposition to experience high levels of anxiety that affects behaviour 
(Eysenck & Calvo, 1992) whilst state anxiety refers to a negative emotional state in response 
to a specific situation and is commonly associated with physiological arousal (Robinson, 
Vytal, Cornwell, & Grillon, 2013).  
 
It is well-documented that anxiety affects attention allocation. The Quiet Eye (QE), 
defined as the final fixation on a specific location prior to the execution of a motor action, is 
an objective measure of visual attention, with longer QE periods leading to improved 
performance (Vine, Moore, & Wilson, 2011). Behan and Wilson (2008) revealed that, as 
anxiety increased, there was a reduction in QE duration and shooting accuracy in a 
simulated archery task (see Nibbeling, Oudejans, Ubink, and Daanen, 2014, for similar 
results). Increased variability in gaze behaviour under conditions of anxiety has been shown 
in table-tennis (Williams, Vickers, Rodrigues, & Hillis, 2000), aviation (Allsop and Gray, 2014) 
and rally driving (Wilson, Chattington, and Marple-Horvat, 2008). Attentional biases are also 
well-documented in anxiety-provoking situations. Participants allocate more attention to 
salient (Ferreira & Murray, 1983) and threatening stimuli (Bar-Haim, Lamy, Pergamin, 
Bakermans-Kranenburg, & Van ljzendoorn, 2007) because anxiety biases the attentional 
alerting systems (Beck & Clark, 1997). Taken together, these studies demonstrate an effect 
of anxiety on attention allocation.  
 
 Following a significant body of research showing an effect of anxiety on attention 
allocation, theoretical models that provide a mechanistic account of the relationship have 
been developed. Attentional bias models argue that, under anxiety, attention is biased 
towards threatening stimuli and individuals are unable to disengage from the processing of 
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such information (see Weierich, Treat, & Hollingworth, 2008, for review). Self-focus theories 
(e.g. Explicit Monitoring Hypothesis, Beilock & Carr, 2001; Theory of Reinvestment, Masters 
& Maxwell, 2008) argue that, when anxious, individuals shift more attention to the skill 
execution process, which was previously automatic, which leads to ‘overthinking’ and a 
reduction in performance (Lewis & Linder, 1997). In contrast, distraction theories suggest 
that attention is diverted away from the task towards feelings of worry and apprehension in 
anxiety provoking situations. Such feelings utilise the attentional resource and, therefore, 
interfere with the efficiency of task execution contributing to a reduction in performance 
(Beilock & Carr, 2001).  
 
Eysenck and Calvo (1992) proposed Processing Efficiency Theory (PET) which 
distinguishes between the effectiveness (i.e. the quality of performance) and efficiency (i.e. 
the effectiveness of performance divided by the effort) of performance. Feelings of worry 
are resource-intensive which leads to a reduction in the resource available for main task 
execution and, ultimately, a decrease in the efficiency of performance. Meanwhile, worry 
motivates the individual to increase their task-effort to maintain the effectiveness of 
performance. Eysenck and Calvo (1992) argue that anxiety effects efficiency more than 
effectiveness, with PET explaining that individuals experiencing higher anxiety can achieve 
equivalent performance by expending extra effort. 
 
 Attentional Control Theory (ACT) is a theoretical development of PET that explains 
how anxiety effects attentional processes, specifically (Eysenck et al., 2007). Corbetta and 
Shulman (2002) distinguish between two attentional control systems: a stimulus-driven 
bottom-up system and a goal-directed top-down system. ACT proposes that anxiety leads to 
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an increase in bottom-up processing and a decrease in top-down processing.  Therefore, 
more of the attentional resource is likely to be allocated to distracting stimuli (e.g. 
worrisome thoughts) over task-relevant stimuli. This theory also highlights compensatory 
mechanisms whereby individuals boost their top down control of attentional processes by 
increasing effort and, therefore, maintain a sufficient level of attention to successfully 
complete the task (Booth & Peker, 2017; Eysenck et al., 2007). 
 
 Easterbrook (1959) proposed a theory of Attentional Narrowing which describes the 
involuntary narrowing of the attentional window. Such narrowing leads to an increase in 
performance on a central task, that represents the focussing of the attentional window, and 
a decrease in performance on a peripheral task, due to a reduction in the range of cues that 
can be utilised (Easterbrook, 1959; Mueller, Smith, & Jones, 1976). Shappell and Wiegmann 
(2003) propose that attentional narrowing contributes to accidents in domains such as 
aviation due to an inability to process all peripheral information. Janelle, Singer, and 
Williams (1992) showed that participants in an auto racing simulation were less successful at 
detecting peripherally presented targets when they were anxious, but performance on the 
main driving task was maintained. In a dual-task study Murray and Janelle (2003) found that, 
as anxiety increased, search rate on a secondary task was significantly slower but  
performance on a central driving simulation task was maintained. Using the 7.5% CO2 
challenge model of anxiety induction, Diaper, Nutt, Munafò, White, Farmer, and Bailey 
(2012) reported no effect of anxiety on performance in a central tracking task but 
detrimental performance effects in a secondary digit response task when participants 
inhaled air enriched with carbon dioxide. These studies demonstrate attentional narrowing 
across tasks (i.e. central versus peripheral tasks) rather than to distinct objects within the 
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same task (i.e. high versus low priority targets). The unequal attention splitting task used in 
Chapters 2 and 3 allows a direct test of attentional narrowing, the results of which could 
distinguish between fixed and flexible accounts.   
 
 Testing the theory of attention narrowing can provide insight into the structure of 
the attentional resource that underlies tracking. Under a fixed architectural account 
consisting of four slots, participants can split attention unequally between two targets in 
one way. Specifically, they can allocate one and three slots to a low and high priority target, 
respectively. Under conditions of anxiety, attentional narrowing would predict that 
participants allocate more attention to a high priority target relative to the low priority 
target. Since there is only one way to split four slots unequally, fixed accounts cannot 
explain results that are indicative of attentional narrowing. In contrast, flexible and hybrid 
slots could explain data demonstrating attentional narrowing within an unequal attention 
splitting MOT task. 
 
Two types of anxiety induction have commonly been used in the literature: cognitive 
and physiological. Cognitive anxiety induction uses financial reward, social comparisons, 
performance thresholds and non-contingent feedback (e.g. participants performing in 
lowest 30%; e.g. Behan & Wilson, 2008; Murray & Janelle, 2003; Wilson, Vine & Wood, 
2009) and aims to induce the cognitive symptoms of anxiety. It has been effectively applied 
in several domains including sport (e.g. Wilson, Vine, & Wood, 2009), aviation (e.g. Allsop & 
Gray, 2014; Allsop, Gray, Bulthoff, & Chuang, 2016) and cognitive tasks (e.g. Thompson, 
Webber, &, Montgomery, 2002). Physiological anxiety induction can be implemented using 
the 7.5% CO2 challenge model. This model has been validated regarding its ability to induce 
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the physiological symptoms of anxiety which, in turn, leads to the emergence of cognitive 
symptoms (Bailey, Argyropoulos, Kendrick, & Nutt, 2005). Two experiments examined the 
effect of anxiety on unequal attention splitting within a MOT framework. First, Experiment 7 
used a cognitive anxiety induction technique which was unsuccessful.  Therefore, 
Experiment 8 used the 7.5% CO2 challenge model of anxiety induction to induce both 
physiological and cognitive state anxiety.  
 
4.3 Experiment 7 
 
Experiment 7 examined the effect of cognitively induced anxiety on unequal attention 
allocation in a MOT task.  
 
4.3.1 Method 
 
Participants. Thirty-five participants (21 females, 14 males, range 18 - 23) from the 
University of Bristol volunteered to take part10. Six participants’ data were lost due to 
technical difficulties. G*Power version 3.1 (Faul et al., Buchner, 2007) was used to calculate 
sample size for all experiments.  The sample size was determined using a previous study 
that investigated the effect of 7.5% CO2-induced anxiety on speech perception (Mattys, 
Seymour, Attwood, & Munafò, 2013). This study indicated an effect size difference between 
gas and air of dz = 0.57. Based on this estimate, 35 participants were required to achieve 
90% power to observer a similar main effect of gas at an alpha level of 5%. 
 
                                                                
10 India Derrick assisted with data collection.  
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Design.  A repeated measures design with two within-subject factors of anxiety (no anxiety, 
anxiety) and target priority (low (25%), high (75%)) was used. The order of anxiety 
manipulation was counterbalanced across participants and participants completed both 
conditions within one testing session.  
 
Measures. The primary dependent variable was magnitude of angular error, indexed by the 
degree of error from the queried target’s actual trajectory (i.e. the direction it was heading 
in) to the participant’s reported trajectory at the end of the trial. The proportion of guess 
trials and precision of representations, calculated from the mixture modelling analysis (see 
Chapters 1 and 2), were also dependent variables. Blood pressure (BP), heart rate (HR), 
galvanic skin response (GSR) were also recorded using an OMRON M6 cuff monitor and 
MINDFIELD eSEnse skin responses, respectively. There were also two questionnaires: 1) The 
Spielberger State (SSAI-State) (Spielberger et al., 1983); 2) Positive and Negative Affect 
Schedule (PANAS) (Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988).  
 
Stimuli. The trajectory-tracking task was used. Participants completed 5 practice trials 
followed by 120 experimental trials in 2 blocks (i.e. anxiety, no anxiety conditions). The 
experiment lasted approximately 1 hour. 
 
Procedure. Prior to the study session, participants received the information sheet and 
details of their study session via email. On arrival, participants were given the opportunity to 
ask any further questions. They then completed the two baseline questionnaires and 
baseline HR and BP measures were recorded. Participants completed five practice trials to 
familiarise themselves with the task. Next, a device was fitted to participant’s left hand to 
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record the galvanic skin response (GSR) throughout each anxiety condition. Participants 
were not aware of the anxiety manipulation and, therefore, were told that the GSR was 
used to measure their engagement with the task. HR and BP was recorded after the 
completion of each condition.  
 
Participants were then given instructions related to the condition in which they were about 
to perform (i.e. no anxiety, anxiety). The order of instructions and, therefore, conditions, 
was counterbalanced across participants. After having received their first set of instructions, 
participants completed the questionnaires and then began the experimental task. At the 
end of the task, participants were given the other set of instructions, filled out the 
questionnaires and completed the experimental task again. After having completed both 
conditions, the participants received a full debrief. 
 
Task Instructions  
No anxiety condition. Participants were told that an experiment was being piloted to check 
the visual displays, therefore, generating a relaxed environment. Participants received non-
evaluative instructions asking them to simply have a go at the task and do their best. 
 
Anxiety condition. State anxiety was induced using techniques adapted from the sporting 
literature (e.g. Wilson, Vine, & Wood, 2009). Participants were told that they must perform 
above an 80% correct threshold in order for their data to be used in the study and that their 
results would be published around the department. Participants were also told that the top 
three performing participants would receive a monetary reward. During testing the 
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experimenter walked up and down behind them and reminded them of their need to be 
above 80%, by commenting during breaks.  
4.3.2 Results and Discussion 
 
To assess whether the anxiety manipulation had been successful, reactivity scores 
were calculated by subtracting the baseline recordings from each measure. Paired-samples 
t-tests were then conducted. Participants heart rate reactivity was higher in the anxiety (M = 
5.3, SD = 9.15) compared with the non-anxiety condition (M = 1.5, SD = 10.23), t(28) = 3.57, 
p = .001, d = 2.09. There was, however, no effect of anxiety condition on blood pressure 
(both SBP and DBP: t < 1.88, p  > .070) or galvanic skin response t(20) = 0.17, p = .868, d < 
0.01.  Results from the questionnaires also revealed no difference in subjective anxiety (all t 
< 0.38, p > .706). Taken together, there is limited evidence that the anxiety manipulation 
was successful.  
 
LME analysis was used. Anxiety and Target Priority were entered into the model as 
fixed effects, along with an Anxiety by Target Priority interaction. There was also a random 
intercept for subjects. There was a main effect of target priority (t = 3.81, p = .005), with a 
lower magnitude of angular error for the high priority targets (see Figure 4.1, left panel). 
There was neither a main effect of anxiety (t = 0.48, p = .633), nor an interaction (t = 0.81, p 
= .419). There was a main effect of target priority on the proportion of guessing (t = 2.13, p = 
.035), with a lower proportion of guessing for the high priority targets (see Figure 4.1, right 
panel). There was neither a main effect of anxiety (t = 0.32 p = .752), nor an interaction (t = 
0.67, p = 501). There was no effect of target priority or anxiety on the precision of tracking 
and no interaction (all t < 1.05, p > .296). A possible explanation for this is that six 
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participants data was lost and, therefore, there was not sufficient power to detect an effect 
of priority on precision of tracking. Post-hoc analysis indicated an effect size dz = 0.12 for 
comparison between low and high priority targets on precision of tracking which achieved 
only a 16% chance of detecting the effect.  
Figure 4.1. Mean magnitude of error (left panel) and proportion of guessing (right panel) for 
each condition in Experiment 7. Error bars represent 95% within-subject confidence 
intervals using Morey (2008). 
 
Taken together, these results suggest that the anxiety manipulation was not 
successful. Although there was evidence for higher heart rate in the anxiety condition, it is 
likely that this reflects an increase in task engagement because participants were given a 
performance threshold (Seery, 2011) rather than participants experiencing anxiety. 
Although this cognitive anxiety induction method has frequently been used (e.g. Behan & 
Wilson, 2008; Murray & Janelle, 2003; Wilson, Vine & Wood, 2009), it has most commonly 
been in the sporting domain (although it has also been used in cognitive tasks, albeit less 
frequently). In such tasks, the participants often have an interest in the sporting task and are 
competing against their team mates which likely increases motivation and leads to 
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successfully anxiety inductions. In contrast, the MOT task used here was not of high 
importance or relevance to the participant’s interests and, therefore, participants may not 
have been sufficiently motivated to experience anxiety.  
Psychological paradigms can misrepresent anxiety as a predominantly cognitive 
response, but anxiety results in both physiological and cognitive symptoms (Bailey, Kendrick, 
Diaper, Potokar, & Nutt, 2007; Seddon et al., 2011). An alternative method of anxiety 
induction is the 7.5% CO2 challenge model of anxiety induction which induces both the 
physiological and cognitive symptoms of anxiety (Bailey et al., 2005, although see Hopko, 
McNeil, Lejuez, Ashcraft, Eifert, & Riel, 2003, for discussion on the extent to which cognitive 
arousal (e.g. worry) is induced). The inhalation of CO2 leads to hypercapnia (increased levels 
of CO2 in the body) which changes the pH level of the blood, resulting in increased 
respiration as a compensatory response. This leads to secondary physiological changes such 
as increased heart rate (HR) and systolic blood pressure (SBP). Cognitive appraisal of the 
physiological effects leads to the psychological symptoms of anxiety, evidenced by increases 
in self-reported anxiety, fear and tension, and decreases in relaxation (Bailey & Nutt, 2008; 
Cooper et al., 2011; Diaper et al., 2012).  
 
Research has used the 7.5% CO2 challenge model of anxiety induction to explore the 
effect of anxiety on numerous cognitive domains (see Fluharty, Attwood, & Munafo, 2016, 
for a review). Easey et al. (2018) showed that state anxiety negatively affected simple 
information processing and Attwood, Catling, Kwong, and Munafo (2015) showed anxiety 
contributed to a decrease in accuracy for face memory. Specifically relevant to attention 
allocation, Garner, Attwood, Baldwin, James, and Munafò (2011) showed that, in an 
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emotional antisaccade task, anxious participants incorrectly directed attention, indexed by 
eye movements, towards threating stimuli on antisaccade trials. Given its extensive use with 
cognitive tasks, this method of anxiety might better induce anxiety within a MOT 
framework.  
 
4.4 Experiment 8 
 
Since Experiment 7 was unsuccessful at inducing anxiety in participants, Experiment 8 used 
the 7.5% CO2 challenge model of anxiety induction which has been validated as inducing 
both the physiological (e.g. increase in systolic blood pressure and heart rate) and 
psychological (e.g. increased ratings of anxiety and fear) effects of anxiety (Bailey et al., 
2005).  
 
4.4.1 Method 
 
Participants. Thirty-six participants (19 females, 17 males, range 18 - 27) took part. One 
participant’s data was lost due to technical issues. Participants were recruited from existing 
mailing lists, the School of Psychological Science website, posters and word of mouth (see 
Appendix 3 for Consolidation Standards of Reporting Trials (CONSORT) Flow Diagram)11. The 
sample size calculation was identical to Experiment 8. After an expression of interest, 
participants had a 10 minute telephone screening to asses study eligibility. Having 
completed the telephone screening, participants were invited to attend a day screen and 
underwent further tests to ensure they met the eligibility criteria (see Appendix 2). All 
participants were reimbursed £20 for their time. A total of 55 participants attended day 
                                                                
11 Hannah Cook, Megan Manuel and Grace Lakey assisted with data collection.   
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screening, with 7 failing to meet at least one eligibility criteria and 12 withdrawing during 
the CO2 inhalation phase of the study (see Appendix 2).  
 
Design. A repeated measures design with two within-subject factors of gas (medical air, CO2) 
and target priority (low, high) was used. The order of gas inhalation was counterbalanced 
across participants using a random number generator (http://www.randomizer.org). 
Administration of the gas was single-blind for safety measures.  
 
Materials 
Gas mixture. The gas mixtures used were CO2 7.5%/O2 21%/N 71.5% and medical air (O2 
21%). The gases were administered through an oro-nasal facemask (Hans Rudolph, Inc., 
Shawnee, KS) which was attached to a 500 L Douglas bag (Cranlea Human Performance 
Testing Ltd., Birmingham, UK) with tubing. To confirm the validity of the 7.5% CO2 model as 
an anxiety manipulation paradigm, subjective responses (STAI-S) and physiological measures 
(HR and BP) were recorded after each inhalation.  
 
Multiple-Object Tracking Task. The MOT task was identical to the one used in Experiment 7. 
Participants first completed five practice trials. They then completed 120 experimental trials 
split into two blocks (i.e. gas, CO2). Each block lasted approximately 12 minutes.  
 
Measures  
Cardiovascular Measures. Blood pressure and heart rate was recorded using the OMRON 
M6 cuff.  
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Tracking accuracy. Magnitude of angular error, proportion of guessing and precision of 
tracking were estimated to obtain indexes of tracking accuracy in line with Experiment 7.  
 
Questionnaires. Questionnaire measures included: 1) the Spielberg State (SSAI) and 2) Trait 
Anxiety Inventory (STAI) Spielberger et al., (1983); 3) the Anxiety Sensitivity Index (ASI; 
Peterson & Reiss, 1992); 4) the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS; Watson, Clark 
& Tellegen,1988); 5) the Eysenck Personality Questionnaire-Revised (EPQ-R; Eysenck & 
Eysenck, 1991)12. Psychiatric history was assessed using the Mini International 
Neuropsychiatric Interview (Sheehan et al., 1998). 
 
Procedure 
Prior to the session, participants underwent a telephone screen to assess basic eligibility. 
Eligible participants attended a single test session, at which they were given the opportunity 
to read the study information sheet again and ask any questions. Further screening 
assessments were conducted to confirm the self-reported information from the telephone 
screening and identify any changes (e.g. new medication) since the telephone screening. If 
eligibility was met, baseline questionnaire (SSAI, STAI, PANAS, ASI) and cardiovascular (blood 
pressure [BP] and heart rate [HR]) measures were recorded. Participants were then given 
instructions about the MOT task and completed five practice trials to familiarise themselves 
with the procedure. Once participants were happy to continue, the first inhalation stage 
began. Participants were given information about the inhalation and informed they were 
allowed to stop at any point if they wished to do so. The oro-nasal mask was then fitted, 
                                                                
12 STAI, ASI and EPQ were included to support a wider research question and are therefore not explored in this 
chapter.  
 
101 
 
ensuring maximum comfort. The inhalation began with 60s of free breathing before the 
tasks were started (this allowed for the gas to start taking effect before data collection 
began). Inhalations then continued for approximately 12 minutes whilst participants 
completed the 60 trials of the MOT task. Immediately after each inhalation, measures of BP, 
HR, SSAI, and PANAS were completed. Participants were asked to think back to, and answer, 
on the basis of when the gas was at its strongest. There was a 30-min washout period 
between inhalations. The second inhalation followed the same procedure as the first. After 
the inhalations were complete, participants remained in the room for a minimum of 20 
minutes, to allow any effects to dissipate and ensure good recovery from inhalation. Before 
participants were able to leave, BP and HR were measured to establish that they had 
returned to baseline. The testing session lasted approximately 2.5 hours. Participants were 
then debriefed and reimbursed. A follow-up call was conducted within 24 hours to assess 
whether any adverse events had occurred.  
 
4.4.2 Results and Discussion 
 
Reactivity scores were calculated to check the anxiety manipulation was successful. 
One and two participants were removed from the PANAS and SSAI analysis, respectively, 
due to incomplete data. Baseline recordings were subtracted from measures after each 
inhalation and paired-samples t-tests were then conducted. State anxiety (SSAI), negative 
affect (PANAS-negative), HR and SBP increased and positive affect (PANAS-positive) 
decreased more from baseline after the CO2 inhalation compared with air inhalation, 
confirming the validity of the anxiety manipulation.   
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 Mean (SD) df t-value p-value Effect Size 
(dz) Gas CO2 
SSAI   3.29 (7.57) 17.35 (11.68) 33 8.51 <.001 1.37 
PANAS-negative 1.00 (4.41) 6.11 (6.49) 34 5.10 <.001 0.89 
PANAS-positive -2.80 (6.62) -8.09 (7.32) 34 5.06 <.001 0.71 
SBP (Reactivity) 0.17 (9.63) 6.83 (15.38) 35 2.48 .018 0.49 
DBP (Reactivity) 1.81 (6.04) 3.11 (7.15) 35 0.88 .383 0.20 
HR (Reactivity) -3.31 (6.89) 1.00 (8.33) 35 2.99 .005 0.56 
Table 1. Descriptive and inferential statistics for manipulation checks in Experiment 8.  
 
The LME analysis conducted was identical to Experiment 7. There was a main effect 
of target priority on the magnitude of angular error (t = 2.82, p = .006), with a lower 
magnitude of angular error for the high priority targets compared to the low priority targets 
(see Figure 4.2, left panel). There was neither a main effect of anxiety (t = 0.26, p = .796), 
nor an interaction (t = 0.25, p = .804). There was a main effect of target priority on the 
proportion of guessing (t = 2.35, p = .020), with a less guessing for the high priority targets 
(see Figure 4.2, right panel). There was neither a main effect of anxiety (t = 0.36 p = .722), 
nor an interaction (t = 0.53, p = .595). There was no effect of target priority or anxiety on the 
precision of tracking and no interaction (all t < 1.65, p > .101).  
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 Figure 4.2. Mean magnitude of error (left panel) and proportion of guessing (right panel) for 
each condition in Experiment 8. Error bars represent 95% within-subject confidence 
intervals using Morey (2008). 
 
The results show that the 7.5% CO2 challenge model of anxiety induction was 
successful in inducing state anxiety, highlighting its advantages over cognitive anxiety 
induction. There was no evidence for an effect of anxiety on attention allocation, indexed by 
magnitude of angular error, proportion of guessing and precision of tracking. There was an 
effect of target priority on both the magnitude of angular error and proportion of guessing, 
with higher tracking accuracy and a lower proportion of guessing observed for high priority 
targets. This finding fits with results from Chapters 1 and 2 indicating that participants can 
split attention unequally, although there was no effect of priority on precision. There was 
also no evidence for an interaction and, therefore, no evidence for attentional narrowing.   
 
 Eysenck and Calvo (1992) highlighted the complexity and inconsistency in findings 
regarding the direction of the effect of anxiety on performance. There is evidence 
demonstrating that both an increase and decrease in performance is possible under anxiety-
provoking situations (see Wilson, 2012, for a review). These differential responses are well-
captured in the sporting literature which distinguishes between choking (i.e. suboptimal 
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performance, Hill, Hanton, Matthew, & Fleming, 2010) and clutch (i.e. superior performance 
in anxiety-provoking situations, Otten, 2009) performance. An exploratory investigation of 
the data was therefore conducted to examine whether the null effect of anxiety on tracking 
accuracy was due to the sample consisting of some chokers and some clutch performers. To 
split the sample, difference scores were calculate by subtracting the magnitude of error 
during the inhalation of gas (collapsed over target priority) from the magnitude of error 
during the inhalation of CO2 (also collapsed over target priority). Ordered in terms of change 
in magnitude of angular error, Figure 4.3 (left panel) showed that some participants 
demonstrated a decrease in magnitude of error from the gas to CO2 condition (i.e. negative 
value) and others demonstrated an increase (i.e. positive value) indicative of individual 
differences. Figure 4.3 (right panel) shows the distribution of the data and further suggests 
that the possibility of sub-groups should be explored in future research.    
 
 
 
Figure 4.3. Change in magnitude of error between the air and CO2 inhalation for each 
participant (left panel) and the distribution of change scores (right panel). 
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4.5 General Discussion 
 
Two experiments investigated the effect of state anxiety on unequal attention 
allocation in a MOT task to test the theory of attentional narrowing. Experiment 7 used a 
cognitive anxiety induction technique, but this method was not successful at inducing 
anxiety. Experiment 8 therefore used the 7.5% CO2 challenge model of anxiety induction. 
Although the anxiety manipulation was successful, there was no evidence for attentional 
narrowing. Therefore, these results cannot further distinguish between fixed and flexible 
accounts of MOT beyond the findings from Chapters 2 and 3. 
  
In line with Chapters 2 and 3, both experiments revealed evidence for an effect of 
target priority on tracking accuracy (i.e. magnitude of error, proportion of guessing), 
indicating unequal attention allocation. Nevertheless, there was no effect of priority on the 
precision of tracking which contrasts the results from Chapters 2 and 3. This indicates that 
the higher proportion of guessing trials for the low priority target drives the differences 
revealed in the magnitude of error index between high and low priority targets. A possible 
explanation is that the fewer experimental trials in this experiment (i.e. 60 trials compared 
to 120 and 250 trials in previous experiments), which was required to fit the experimental 
task into the 12 minutes of CO2 inhalation for safety reasons, masked the effects of priority 
on precision.  
 
 Experiment 8 also revealed no evidence for an effect of anxiety on tracking 
performance. An exploratory investigation into the data indicated that it is possible that any 
effect of anxiety was masked because there were two types of participants: those whose 
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performance increased and those who decreased during the CO2 inhalation. Importantly, 
the order of inhalations was not responsible for the different directions of performance 
indicated. Specifically, participants did not always perform better in the inhalation that they 
completed second which would indicate training effects rather than individual differences 
effects. This is, perhaps, unsurprising given previous studies showing that the effect of 
anxiety can be bi-directional (e.g. Hill et al., 2010, Otten, 2009) and several theories which 
recognise individual differences in response to anxiety.  
 
Some theories suggest an individuals’ appraisal of an anxiety-provoking situation 
affects performance (e.g. Jones & Swain, 1992; Lazarus & Folkman, 1984). The Directional 
Perspective argues that an individual interprets the symptoms of anxiety as either 
debilitative (i.e. distract or interfere with task execution) which leads to bad performance, 
or facilitative (i.e. help mental preparation) which leads to good performance (Jones & 
Swain, 1992). This theory links to the Transactional Perspective of Stress (Lazarus & 
Folkman, 1984) which suggest that individuals evaluate the demands and resources 
available to them when completing a given task. Poor performance is observed when 
perceived demands exceed available resources, whereas good performance is seen when 
resources outweigh demands. Although these models explain the mixed results regarding 
the effect of anxiety on performance, they are entirely descriptive and do not explain the 
underlying mechanisms driving this relationship. Further research is required to better 
understand individual differences in response to anxiety and develop methods to capture 
such disparities in experimental designs.   
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 Some participants showed no effect of anxiety on MOT performance. A possible 
explanation for a genuine null effect of anxiety on tracking accuracy is compensatory effort 
by participants during the inhalation of 7.5% CO2, an idea proposed by Attentional Control 
Theory (Eysenck et al., 2007). Hardy and Hutchinson (2007) showed that an increase in the 
cognitive appraisal of anxiety (which was demonstrated in Experiment 8) leads to an 
increase in effort. In line with Attentional Control Theory, participants may have adopted 
compensatory strategies such as utilising additional processing resources when they 
experienced symptoms of anxiety which contributed to equivalent performance in the air 
and CO2 condition (Derakshan & Eysenck, 2009). This interpretation fits with Diaper et al. 
(2012), who found an effect of CO2 inhalation on physiological measures and subjective 
ratings of anxiety but not on performance. The authors suggested that this was due to 
participants exerting greater cognitive effort, although note these authors did not look for 
individual differences. Since Experiments 7 and 8 were not designed to test ACT, indexes of 
effort were not recorded. Future research could directly address this by using pupillometry 
measures to index effort (Alnæs, Sneve, Espeseth, Endestad, van de Pavert, Laeng, 2014). 
Alternatively, Diaper et al., (2012) showed that reaction time can be used to index effort, 
and subjective questionnaires (e.g. Subjective Rating of Mental Effort, Paas, 1992) have also 
been validated in quantifying mental effort (e.g. Young, Van Merrienboer, Durning, & Ten 
Cate, 2014). Together, these methods could provide insight into the extent to which effort 
contributes to the maintenance of performance under pressure. 
 
Hopko et al., (2013) suggested that the 7.5% CO2 challenge manipulates physiological 
arousal, but does not effect all hallmarks of cognitive anxiety. Endler and Kocovski (2001) 
argue that there are at least two facets of state anxiety: cognitive worry and autonomic-
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emotional. The automatic-emotional feelings (e.g. “I am tense” from the SSAI) are directly 
affected by physiological arousal whereas the cognitive worry feelings (e.g. “I am worried” 
from the SSAI) might not be. A participant in this experimental set up knows that they are 
about to inhale air enriched with CO2 and also knows they are in a safe place and can 
therefore rationalise the physiological effects and not feel worried. Therefore, although the 
subjective questionnaires indicate an increase in cognitive anxiety in the CO2 compared to 
air inhalation, such changes could be driven by the physiological components of anxiety only 
rather than an overall increase in all hallmarks of anxiety. Therefore, it is possible that 
cognitive anxiety remained relatively low and the physiological arousal induced by the CO2 
inhalation may not have reached a threshold at which detrimental effects on attentional 
performance were observed.  
 
 The participant sample and dropout rate from Experiment 9 requires consideration. 
Twelve participants (24%) withdrew during the inhalation of CO2. This high rate of 
withdrawal has not been reported in other research using this anxiety induction technique 
(e.g. Bailey et al., 2005; Diaper et al., 2012), although not all studies report any rate of 
withdrawal and, therefore, this may be a reporting omission. This withdrawal rate is, 
however, high compared to other work from this lab, although withdrawal rates have 
increased over time. Therefore, this study is important in highlighting the potential bias in 
the remaining sample as driving the results. Spielberger (1966) showed that trait anxious 
individuals are more prone to experiencing state anxiety. Therefore, it is possible that the 
participants who withdrew were high trait anxious, which resulted in them experiencing a 
heightened response to inhaling CO2 and, ultimately, their withdrawal. Therefore, the 
remaining sample could have represented participants who did not respond as strongly and 
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were less likely to show any effects. Due to ethical guidelines, we were unable to analyse 
the demographics (e.g. trait levels of anxiety) of those participants who withdrew. 
Nevertheless, Fluharty, Attwood, and Munafò (2016) showed an association between trait 
anxiety and participants’ response to the CO2 inhalation, with high trait anxious individuals 
being more likely to respond (i.e. experience anxiety) to both CO2 and air and, ultimately 
perform similarly in both conditions. Future research should consider individual differences 
in response to anxiety during recruitment and analysis.   
 
This chapter tested the theory of attentional narrowing to gain insight into the 
structure of the resource that underlies MOT. There was no interaction between anxiety 
and priority and, therefore, no evidence for attentional narrowing. Further research is 
needed to examine the extent to which individual differences effect anxiety research and 
assess the efficacy of the 7.5% CO2 challenge model of anxiety induction at inducing all 
hallmarks of cognitive anxiety.   
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Chapter 5 Discussion 
 
5.1 Chapter Summary 
 
There is continued debate regarding the nature of the attentional resource that 
underlies tracking. Further empirical work is therefore needed to distinguish between fixed 
and flexible accounts of attention. Current theories of MOT are based on the results of 
experiments using equal attention splitting paradigms. Since this is atypical of the real world 
in which an individual often needs to prioritise one object relative to another, this thesis 
introduced a novel unequal attention splitting paradigm to distinguish theories of MOT. In 
this chapter, the primary findings from the three empirical chapters are summarised. 
Theoretical and practical implications of this work are discussed and directions for future 
research are identified. Finally, the main conclusions of this thesis are outlined.  
 
5.2 Overview of Main Findings 
 
5.2.1 Chapter 2: Goal-directed attention allocation during multiple object tracking 
 
In everyday situations, it is common that individuals must prioritise one object 
relative to another and so allocate attention unequally. Chapter 2 investigated whether 
participants can split attention unequally between moving objects. Four experiments 
revealed evidence for unequal attention splitting in a goal-directed manner in standard 
MOT, position- and trajectory- tracking tasks. Participants could allocate more attention to a 
high priority target, indexed by a lower magnitude of error, lower proportion of guessing 
and higher precision. Experiments 1 and 2 investigated the extent to which this ability was 
fine-grained, namely the precision with which attention can be split. There was inconclusive 
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evidence for fine-grained splitting. It is possible that participants have the capacity to split 
according to any unit but were unable to gauge what a given unit of the attentional resource 
was or were not sufficiently motivated to split beyond a binary more and less mechanism. 
To overcome these limitations, an alternative method of manipulating attention in a goal-
directed manner, such as reward, was required.  
 
 Since guessing rates remained low across all conditions and tracking demands were 
below capacity in all experiments, it is unlikely that participants performed single object 
tracking. However, it is possible that, on some trials, participants dropped a target leading 
to the complete withdrawal of attention from that target and, therefore, single object 
tracking for part of a trial. To explore how unequal attention splitting is achieved, research 
must address the within-trial behaviour of participants. One possible method is to explore 
the relationship in tracking accuracy between targets presented simultaneously on a given 
trial.  
 
5.2.2 Chapter 3: Reward-based unequal attention allocation in position tracking 
 
Since it is possible that participants lacked motivation when completing the 
Experiments in Chapter 2, Chapter 3 investigated reward-based unequal attention 
allocation. Chapter 3 also aimed to explore the relationship in tracking accuracy between 
two targets on a given trial to further understanding how unequal attention splitting is 
supported. Experiment 4 revealed unequal attention splitting in a reward-based manner 
supporting research from working memory also showing unequal splitting in response to 
reward (Morey et al., 2011). 
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Experiments 5 and 6 introduced a double-probe procedure in which an index of 
tracking accuracy was obtained for both targets to obtain a TAC score. There was no effect 
of splitting condition on TAC scores in either experiment. Exploratory analysis revealed 
poorer tracking accuracy for the second response compared with the first response, which 
could have masked any effect of splitting type on TAC scores. This fits with other research 
documenting the speed at which memory for target locations degrade (e.g. Howard & 
Holcombe, 2008; Tripathy & Barrett, 2004) and requires further consideration. 
Understanding how other cognitive mechanisms (e.g. memory) or internal factors (e.g. 
anxiety) interact with MOT can provide insight into the complex interplay of processes and 
the structure of the attentional resource.  
 
5.2.3 Chapter 4: No evidence for attentional narrowing within a MOT framework  
 
Chapter 4 tested the theory of attentional narrowing using the unequal attention 
splitting MOT task from Chapters 2 and 3. Experiment 7 used a cognitive anxiety induction 
technique which was unsuccessful. Experiment 8 therefore used a physiological anxiety 
induction technique which was deemed successful at inducing state anxiety. There was no 
evidence for attentional narrowing and, therefore, limited further theoretical insight beyond 
Chapters 2 and 3. In line with Chapters 2 and 3, there was evidence for unequal attention 
splitting between two moving targets in both experiments (although contrary to Chapters 2 
and 3, there was no effect of target priority on precision). There was no effect of anxiety on 
MOT performance. This could be due to individual differences in the sample, with some 
participants responding positively and others negatively to the anxiety induction resulting in 
a null effect. Alternatively, participants could have exerted more effect during the inhalation 
of CO2 which acted as a compensatory mechanism to achieve an equivalent level of 
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performance. The method of anxiety induction requires further consideration to the extent 
to which certain characteristics of state anxiety (e.g. worry, apprehension) are induced by 
the technique.  
 
5.3 Theoretical Implications  
 
Eight studies revealed evidence for unequal attention allocation in a MOT task 
demonstrating some flexibility to the attentional resource. These results cannot be 
accounted for pure fixed models (i.e. four or five slots support tracking). Fixed models could 
account for such findings with the additional assumption that more than one slot could be 
allocated to a given target (e.g. 3 and 1 slot(s) on a high and low priority target, respectively) 
but this explanation is captured by hybrid models of attention allocation.  Specifically, Zhang 
and Luck’s (2008) slots + averaging model suggests that when the number of items to be 
tracked (i.e. when applied to MOT) is below capacity, each item can be assigned more than 
one slot. Since there were only two targets, tracking load was below capacity and, 
therefore, it is possible that participants allocated one and three slots to a low and high 
priority target, respectively, to achieve unequal attention splitting. A slots + resources 
account could also explain this pattern of results, with participants allocating one slot to 
each target but distributing more of the resource to the high priority targets.  
 
Chapter 3 showed that there was no correlation in tracking accuracy between two 
targets presented simultaneously. This is evidence against single object tracking, which 
would predict a strong negative correlation (i.e. an increase in tracking accuracy for the 
tracked target accompanied by a decrease in tracking accuracy for the untracked target). 
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This result also provides insight into the extent to which tracking is achieved by a serial or 
parallel mechanism (or a combination of both), which is another debate within the MOT 
literature. Serial accounts suggest that participants attend to only one target at a given time 
and rapidly switch their attention between all targets (e.g. d’Avossa et al., 2006; Oksama & 
Hyona, 2008). Therefore, a serial account would predict a negative correlation in tracking 
accuracy between two targets because the entire attentional resource will be allocated to 
one target and, therefore, withdrawn entirely from the other. Parallel accounts suggest that 
attention is distributed across all targets simultaneously (e.g. Alvarez & Franconeri, 2007; 
Kazanovich & Borisyuk, 2002; Howe et al., 2010). Such accounts would predict a positive 
correlation in tracking accuracy because any variability in performance, such as attentional 
fluctuations across trials, would be consistent across both targets. Since there was no 
evidence for a correlation in Chapter 3, this is more consistent with contributions from both 
switching and sharing of processing resources between targets for tracking. For example, 
the task demands might determine the extent to which a serial or parallel mechanism 
supports tracking with more serial switching on trials when there is less of the attentional 
resource available (Howard & Holcombe, 2008).  
 
5.4 Practical Implications 
 
The modified MOT task more closely reflects unequal attention allocation captured in 
real-world tracking and, therefore, has practical implications. Chapters 2, 3, and 4 revealed 
evidence for unequal attention splitting. This ability could improve performance in safety 
critical occupations such as the military, or activities such as team sports. For example, in 
the military a soldier would likely need to allocate more attention to the enemy to avoid 
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being shot but also maintain awareness of their own personnel to avoid any accidents. 
Meanwhile in team sports, a footballer would likely pay more attention to the approaching 
attackers but still direct some attention to the location of their team mates. A large body of 
research has examined the efficacy of cognitive training to improve performance in several 
domains including the military (Blacker, Hamilton, Roush, Pettijohn, & Biggs, 2018) and 
sport (Appelbaum & Erickson, 2018). Of high relevance to tracking is the development of 
Neurotracker TM, a 3D-MOT (with a 2D screen) task proposed to optimise mental abilities 
when processing dynamic scenes (Faubert & Sidebottom, 2012) that has been shown to 
improve WM in the military (Vartanian, Coady, & Blackler, 2016) and decision-making in 
football (Romeas, Guldner, & Faubert, 2016). Further developments of cognitive training 
tasks to incorporate unequal attention splitting could be advantageous for performance in 
occupations requiring tracking.   
 
Chapter 3 demonstrated a decrease in accuracy for target positions as the time to 
localise them increased, highlighting a rapid decline in memory (through either interference 
or decay). This has practical implications given that, in the real-world, we must track 
multiple moving objects around our whole visual environment, rather than within one 
location (i.e. a computer screen). For example, a CCTV operator must monitor numerous 
screens, each of which contains multiple moving objects. If every time they shift their 
attention to a different screen, their representations of the objects in the previous screen 
degrade, this could contribute to errors. Given the growing evidence highlighting the rapid 
decline in memory within a MOT framework (e.g. Howard & Holcombe, 2008; Tripathy & 
Barrett, 2004), more research understanding the rate of memory decay within a MOT 
framework is warranted.  
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5.5 Future Directions and Limitations  
 
Three empirical chapters reveal behavioural evidence that participants can split 
attention unequally. A limitation of behavioural methods is that no conclusions can be 
drawn about the online changes in the spatial distribution of attention. As demonstrated in 
the visual search literature, behavioural and electrophysiological evidence can generate 
conflicting findings (e.g. Woodman & Luck, 1999; 2003) and, therefore, electrophysiological 
methods should be used with the unequal attention splitting paradigm. Drew, Horowitz, and 
Vogel (2013) used Contralateral Delay Activity (CDA) amplitude to index the number of 
items being tracked within a given trial and how this was mediated by target speed and 
number of distractors. This enabled a distinction between trials on which swapping and 
dropping occurred. The behavioural experiments presented here cannot distinguish 
between these events, which have implications for the conclusions drawn regarding 
unequal attention splitting, further reinforcing the need to adopt ERP indexes of attention.   
 
Chapter 3 aimed to investigate the relationship in tracking accuracy between two 
targets presented simultaneously. The TAC score did not differentiate between equal and 
unequal splitting trials because of the poor tracking accuracy for the second response. 
Despite the implications of this result for memory, this study provided limited insight into 
the relationship in tracking accuracy. Double-report procedures have the potential to 
demonstrate behavioural differences in equal compared with unequal attention splitting but 
this procedure needs refining. It is possible that the motor action required to press the 
screen to record the first response resulted in a drift of the finger that would be used to 
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record the second response and, therefore, imprecision in one’s response. Moreover, using 
a stylus rather than a finger would facilitate a more precise response.  
 
Despite significant evidence for unequal attention splitting, no strong conclusions 
can be drawn regarding the extent to which this ability is fine-grained. Existing fixed models 
of tracking must add additional assumptions (e.g. more than one slot can be allocated to a 
single object) to explain the results presented here but, currently, the results cannot 
distinguish between fixed and flexible accounts. To achieve this, more targets need to be 
introduced to the task to examine the accuracy-priority slope. Flexible accounts would 
predict a gradual increase in accuracy as priority increases because any type of attention 
splitting is possible (e.g. 31% vs 23% vs 46% over three targets). In contrast, fixed accounts 
would predict a more stepped increase because there are only a limited number of ways in 
which slots can be split. Specifically, there is only one way in which 4 or 5 slots could be split 
unequally between three targets. Targets 1, 2 and 3 could be allocated 1, 2, and 3 slots, 
respectively. Therefore, different types of attention splitting according to either priority or 
reward would lead to the same results. Results indicative of fine-grained splitting could be 
taken as strong evidence against fixed models of MOT.  
 
Experiment 8 revealed no evidence for an effect of anxiety on MOT performance. It 
is possible that the null effect is due to individual differences in participants’ response to 
anxiety. Specifically, the participant sample may have consisted of both clutch (i.e. positive 
response to anxiety) and choke (i.e. negative response to anxiety) performers which 
resulted in no effect of anxiety across the entire participant sample. Given the mixed results 
reported in the literature that highlight individual differences in participants response to 
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anxiety (Eysenck and Calvo, 1992; Wilson, 2012), future research must address this factor 
during recruitment and analysis. In cognitive psychology, median splits have commonly 
been used combine a continuous variable into categorical variables during data analyses 
which is a possible avenue for capturing individual differences (De Coster, Gallucci, & Iselin, 
2011; Iacobucci, Posava, Kardes, Schneider, & Popvich, 2015).  
 
Multiple object tracking (MOT) research is commonly justified as providing insight 
into the attentional mechanisms underlying everyday skills (e.g. driving) and occupations 
(e.g. CCTV monitoring). An aim of this thesis was therefore to modify the MOT task to reflect 
real-world tracking more closely. Further such developments of the MOT task are still 
required to directly test competing models of tracking. Standard MOT tasks index tracking 
accuracy by requiring participants to judge the status (target or non-target), direction, or 
location of objects at the end of a trial. This is atypical of the real world in which individuals 
must both track and monitor their environment to allow them to respond to certain events 
that could occur. For example, a driver must slow down when they see the brake lights on 
the car in front come on. Existing response procedures capture participants’ knowledge 
about the current characteristics of an object. They do not, however, provide any insight 
into how long it takes participants to detect a change in an object’s properties (e.g. 
trajectory, features). This ability is a crucial feature of real-world tracking where individuals 
must split attention across multiple spatially distinct objects until a certain event happens 
that requires an action, for example air traffic controllers monitoring for conflicting routes 
of aircraft (Remington, Johnston, Ruthruff, Gold, & Romera, 2000). Therefore, 
understanding the capacity and time limits for monitoring moving objects for the detection 
of, and reaction to, critical events is required. 
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Some researchers have examined participant’s ability to monitor for changes within 
a MOT task (e.g. Bahrami, 2003; Sears & Pylyshyn, 2000; Vater, Kredel, & Hossner, 2016) but 
none of these studies investigate the basic effect of set size on reaction time to detect 
target-changes which could help inform the debate regarding the structure of the 
attentional resource. Flexible accounts of MOT would predict a graded decline in reaction 
time as set size increases (i.e. slower) because when fewer items are tracked, the resolution 
of tracking is higher (e.g. Alvarez & Franconeri, 2007). Fixed theories would predict no effect 
of set size because each target would be assigned a pre-attentive pointer to support 
tracking. Importantly, fixed theories do not suggest that pointers track featural or identity 
information regarding an object (Pylyshyn, 1989) but this highlights that they are an 
incomplete model of MOT. Scholl, Pylyshyn, and Franconeri (2001) distinguished between 
three types of visual property available during tracking. Individuality allows participants to 
distinguish one object from another. Spatiotemporal properties refer to an object’s location, 
direction, motion and trajectory information which are updated when that object moves. 
Featural properties describe an object’s appearance, including colour, shape, lightness and 
texture and can change during a tracking. Whilst there are theories that directly address 
how spatiotemporal (e.g. Pylyhsyn, 1989; Alvarez & Franconeri, 2007) and individuality (e.g. 
Oksama & Hyönä, 2004) properties are tracked, no models describe the mechanism that 
supports the tracking of featural properties. A complete model of tracking should be able to 
explain how all three properties are tracked.   
 
Other developments can also provide insight into the reference frames that support 
tracking. All chapters presented the MOT task on a single computer screen which is atypical 
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of the real world in which individuals distribute attention to targets in different locations 
within the visual environment (i.e. not just within a single computer screen). Research has 
shown that viewpoint changes can affect tracking (Huff, Meyerhoff, Papenmeier, & Jahn, 
2010; Huff, Papenmeier, Jahn, & Hesse, 2010), with eye-tracking research suggesting that 
gaze on the centroid becomes more stable during viewpoint changes (Huff, Papenmeier, 
Jahn, & Hesse, 2010). Further investigation into the effect of changes in viewpoint can 
provide insight into the extent to which scene-based and object-based reference frames are 
utilised during tracking. 
 
Although there was no evidence for an effect of anxiety on MOT performance, 
understanding the interplay between internal factors (e.g. fatigue) and attention allocation 
is required. Research has shown that fatigue effects attention allocation, with mental 
fatigue proposed to contribute to both inefficient processing (Hopstaken, van der Linden, 
Bakker, & Kompier, 2016) and task disengagement (Hopstaken, van der Linden, Bakker, & 
Kompier, 2015). Despite similar empirical results to the anxiety literature, there are 
substantially fewer theories to explain the relationship between fatigue and attentional 
allocation. Given the dynamic nature of the MOT task, this paradigm is a suitable task in 
which to further explore this relationship.  
 
5.6 Conclusions 
 
The structure of the attentional resource that supports MOT is widely debated. This thesis 
aimed to distinguish fixed and flexible accounts by developing an unequal attention splitting 
MOT task. There is evidence that participants can split attention unequally between 
multiple moving objects which rules out pure fixed models. There is inconclusive evidence 
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regarding the extent to which this ability is fine-grained which is problematic for pure 
flexible models which would predict any division of attention is theoretically possible. 
Hybrid models of attention can account for the results presented in this thesis and, 
therefore, hybrid models specific to MOT must be developed.  
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Appendices 
Appendix 1. Details of deviations from pre-registrations on the Open Science Framework.  
In order to address reviewers’ comments, there are several deviations from the initial pre-
registration of the experiments presented in this thesis. 
All Experiments 
1) One reviewer suggested that we conduct a mixture model analysis (based on Zhang 
and Luck (2008) which provides insight into the proportion of trials on which a 
participant guessed and the precision of tracking. We therefore did not exclude any 
data from the analysis reported in the manuscript.  
 
2) In the pre-registration we stated that we would run both frequentist and Bayesian 
statistics. One reviewer said that the mixture of different analysis was confusing and 
recommended doing either Bayesian or p-value statistics. Therefore, we do not 
report Bayesian statistics in the manuscript. Moreover, a reviewer suggested using 
LME analysis and, therefore, these are used throughout the manuscript.   
 
3) In Experiments 2 - 6, we over-recruit participants due to the method of recruitment 
via the University of Bristol Experimental Hours System. More timeslots than the 
required sample size was put on the system due to high drop-out rate and the group 
testing situation. If a student signs up, they must be given the opportunity to take 
part in the experiment. This led to over-recruitment in some experiments, but no 
data analysis was conducted until all date was collected.  
Experiment 2  
1) In the pre-registration we stated that we would run the analysis on two data sets: 1) 
All Data; 2) Data excluding trials on which participants did not ‘track’ the queried 
target. Participants did not engage with the component of the task which required 
them to use the left and mouse click for a tracked and untracked target respectively. 
Therefore, there was no difference between the two data sets. Moreover, following 
reviewers’ comments we now use a different method to determine the proportion 
of guessing for each participant.  
 
2) In the pre-registration, we state that we would run a one-way ANOVA to explore the 
effect of target priority on the number of ‘tracked’ trials. As mentioned above, 
participants did not engage with this component of the task and, therefore, we could 
not run this analysis. Instead, we used the mixture modelling analysis to provide 
insight into the proportion of guessing.  
 
3) In the pre-registration, we state the we would investigate the effect of target priority 
on response time. Since there was no effect and the reviewers requested us to make 
the manuscript shorter, this analysis is not reported in the manuscript.  
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Experiments 3 and 4 
1) Experiment 2 (group testing) and Experiment 3 were included in the same pre-
registration. Following reviewers’ comments, we now report these as two separate 
Experiments in the manuscript because they used different tasks. Specifically, 
Experiment 2 (group testing) and Experiment 3 used a trajectory and position 
tracking task respectively.  
 
2) In response to further reviewers’ comments regarding the length of the manuscript, 
we combined the data from two identical tasks into Experiment 2 in the current 
manuscript. The only difference was whether participants completed the task alone 
(Experiment 2: single testing) or in groups (Experiment 2: group testing). The same 
qualitative pattern of results was observed when each experiment was analysed 
independently. When experiment was included as a between subject factor there 
were no reliable differences. Note, under a Bayesian framework combining the data 
is equivalent to multiplying the Bayes factors from each experiment (assuming the 
posterior from Experiment N is the prior for Experiment N+2; see Ly, Etz, Marsman, 
Wagenmakers, 2018). 
 
3) In the pre-registration, we stated that we would test whether there was a cost to 
unequal attention splitting compared with equal attention splitting using paired 
samples t-test. There was an effect of attention spitting type in the trajectory 
tracking task but not for the position tracking task. We believe that this is due to the 
slightly different methodologies in these two tasks. Specifically, in the trajectory 
tracking task, the unequal splitting conditions had an identity tracking component 
whereas the equal splitting task did not. In the position tracking task, both attention 
splitting types had an identity tracking component. Following reviewers’ comments 
regarding the length of the manuscript, the analysis is not included in the manuscript 
because it is not the main analysis.  
 
4) In the pre-registration, we state the we would investigate the effect of target priority 
on response time. Since there was no effect and the reviewers requested us to make 
the manuscript shorter, this analysis is not reported in the manuscript.  
 
Experiments 6 and 7 
1) In the pre-registration, we outlined a method for identifying whether participants 
were guessing the final locations of targets. We now use the Zhang and Luck (2008) 
method to address this question.  
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Appendix 2. Details of the eligibility criteria for Experiment 9.   
Inclusion Criteria 
• Be aged between 18-35 years 
• Be in good physical and psychiatric health 
• Have English as first language or equivalent level of fluency. 
• Have normal or corrected-to-normal vision 
 
Exclusion Criteria 
• You consume alcohol within 36 hours of the study session 
• You have recently used illicit drugs  
• You have high blood pressure (higher than 140/90 mmHg) 
• You have high or low heart rate (lower than 50 or higher than 90 beats per minute) 
• You are pregnant or breastfeeding 
• Your Body mass index (BMI) is less than 17 kg/m2 or greater than 30 kg/m2 
• You have significant current or past medical or psychiatric illness 
• You have a personal or strong family history of mood disorder, including panic 
disorder 
• You have ongoing physical illness or abnormality (e.g., history of cardiac or respiratory 
problems, including asthma) 
• You have personal history of migraine  
• You are not registered with a general practitioner (GP) 
• You drink more than 35 alcoholic units*/week for females and 50 units*/week for 
males 
• You drink more than eight caffeinated drinks per day 
• You have a personal history of alcoholism or drug dependence 
• You are currently using medication use (except local treatment, aspirin or 
paracetamol); within past 8 weeks if study session 
• You have impaired or uncorrected vision 
• You have impaired or uncorrected hearing 
 
* One unit equals one 25ml single measure of spirit (ABV 40%), or a third of a pint of beer 
(ABV 5-6%) or half a standard (175ml) glass of red wine (ABV 12%). 
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Appendix 3. Consolidation Standards of Reporting Trials (CONSORT) Flow Diagram 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Day Screening: 
Assessed for eligibility: (n=55) 
 
Withdrawn: (n=7) 
   Medication issue: (n=0) 
   Other: (n=7) 
• Carbon Monoxide levels: (n=1) 
• Failed drugs screening: (n=2) 
• High Heart Rate: (n=2) 
• Psychiatric Health (n=2) 
 
Completed (n=36) 
Males: (n=17) 
Females: (n=19) 
 
Testing Day: (n=61) 
 
 
 
 
Excluded: (n=6) 
Did not meet inclusion criteria: (n=1) 
Declined to participate: (n=1) 
Availability issue: (n=4) 
Other (n=) 
Recruitment 
Emails sent: (n = 132) 
Other: (n = 56) 
Failures to recruit: (n=96) 
   Did not meet inclusion criteria: (n=52) 
   Declined to participate: (n=0) 
   No further contact (n=44) 
Telephone Screening:  
Assessed for eligibility: (n=92) 
Excluded: (n=31) 
   Did not meet inclusion criteria: (n=30) 
   Declined to participate: (n=0) 
   Availability issue: (n=1) 
Enrollment 
 
Inhalation Stage: (n=48) 
Males: (n=20) 
Females: (n=28) 
 Withdrawn: (n=12). 
   Adverse reaction: air (n=0) 
   Adverse reaction: CO2 (n=12) 
 
 
 
